“Securing our Survival (SOS)”: non-state actors and the campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention through the prism of securitisation theory by Hessmann Dalaqua, Renata
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON 
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
International Masters in Economy, State and Society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Securing our Survival (SOS)”: 
Non-state actors and the Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons 
Convention through the prism of securitisation theory 
Renata Hessmann Dalaqua 
 
 
 
 
 
Masters thesis written under the supervision of 
Dr. Matthieu Chillaud 
 
 
 
 
 
Tartu 2011 
 
 2 
 
The thesis conforms to the requirements for a Master’s thesis 
........................................................................................(signature of the supervisor and date) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Admitted for the defence .................................................................................................(date) 
Head of Chair: ................................................................................(name, signature and date) 
Chairman of the Defence Committee ......................................................................(signature) 
 
 
 
 
 
I have written the Master’s thesis independently. 
All works and major viewpoints of the other authors, data from other sources of literature 
and elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced. 
 
 
 
 
 
..............................................................................................(signature of the author and date) 
Student’s code 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Abstract 
Largely ignored throughout the 1990s, nuclear disarmament is again a topic for 
mainstream debate. Starting from 2007, when influential political figures began to voice 
arguments in favour of a nuclear-weapon-free world, the anti-nuclear movement has 
experienced a modest revival. Through the prism of securitisation theory, this 
dissertation analyses the security practices of the anti-nuclear movement in the post-
Cold War period. Exploring Buzan and Wæver’s new conceptual developments on 
macrosecuritisations, it was possible to interpret the practices involved in the struggle 
against the Bomb as securitising moves in which the anti-nuclear movement is the 
leading securitiser. In the capacity of the securitising actor, nuclear abolition activists 
argued that nuclear disarmament, under a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), would 
be the only way to protect humankind from the threat posed by the existence of nuclear 
weapons. In order to gain a deep understanding of this securitisation process, a strong, 
empirical analysis of these non-state actors and their campaign for a NWC was carried 
out. Blending the original work of Buzan and Wæver with more recent developments on 
the securitisation theory, it was possible to elaborate a sophisticated framework to guide 
the discourse analysis of the campaign for a NWC conducted in the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) and the institutional bodies of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process. The findings confirmed that the anti-nuclear 
movement follows the particular grammar of security, as it was identified by the 
Copenhagen School (existential threat, urgency, possible way out). It became clear that 
the nuclear abolition activists present the logic of zero as driven by a threat, arguing that 
disarmament under a NWC would put an end to the nuclear menace. Despite uttering 
security, the anti-nuclear movement has so far failed to achieve the proposed security 
measure. Nonetheless, securitisation has been instrumental for these non-state actors, as 
the alarmist tone of the discourse have provided them with a loud voice in international 
military affairs. Moreover, it is possible to see this securitisation process as a way of 
raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action. In 
addition to exploring the instrumentality of securitisation, the analysis here presented 
also aims at understanding major factors that are capable of empowering or 
disempowering the anti-nuclear macrosecuritising discourse. 
Word count: 28.002 
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1. Introduction 
Sixty-five years after Hiroshima, it is now time to retire the Bomb. The will to 
build consensus on this statement and eventually achieve an international nuclear 
abolition regime has been the driving force behind the work of several national and 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
1
 throughout the past decades. 
Forty years have passed since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into 
force and more than twenty years have gone by since the Cold War was brought to an 
end. Yet, the Bomb continues to proliferate inside the five official nuclear powers 
designated by the NPT (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China) and also outside of 
the international regime. Along with vertical and horizontal proliferation,
2
 the 
modernisation of nuclear weaponry has never ceased and the will to fulfil the 1968 
promise of nuclear disarmament, stated in article VI of the NPT,
3
 does not seem to be 
on the agenda of any of the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS).
4
  
But nuclear proliferation and the efforts carried out by states to either curb it or 
encourage it are not the main focus of this research. Non-state actors and their “struggle 
against the Bomb” (Wittner, 1993) are actually at the centre of the analysis that will 
here be presented.  The objective of this study is to explore non-state actors and their 
ability to take part in and influence international politics. More specifically, this 
research is aimed at understanding how nuclear abolition NGOs make use of what are 
notably non-material sources of power – such as knowledge, expertise, public 
sentiment, contacts, moral authority and normative credibility – when interacting with 
                                                 
1
 In this dissertation, NGOs are defined in conformity with the United Nations legal framework that 
governs NGO participation, the resolution 1996/31 of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 
According to this resolution, “any such organization that is not established by a governmental entity or 
intergovernmental agreement shall be considered a non-governmental organization”. In this resolution, 
“organization” may refer to NGOs at the national, subregional, regional and international levels (UN 
Economic and Social Council, 1996). 
2
 Horizontal proliferation is used to refer to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hitherto non nuclear 
weapon states. Accordingly, vertical proliferation refers to the further development, production, and 
deployment of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states. 
3
 Article VI of the NPT states that: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control” (The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968).  
4
 The increased budget of the American nuclear weapons complex, the difficulties related to the Senate 
ratification of the New START Treaty and the lack of support for the ratification of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) are evidences that even the most prominent voice of disarmament 
among the Nuclear Weapon States – the US under the leadership of President Obama – is clearly not 
committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. For more details on the recent developments regarding 
the American Department of Energy and the nuclear weapons complex, see Collina (2011). 
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states in the sphere of international military affairs. In this sense, the discourse 
promoted by these non-state actors, in which the existence of nuclear weapons is 
presented as an existential threat to all humankind, is a key element in the political 
battle to go beyond the current non-proliferation obligations and establish a nuclear 
abolition regime.  
Taking into consideration that the key to understand the power of non-state 
actors in international politics is to understand the power of their discourse 
(Holzscheiter, 2005, p. 725), the securitisation theory stands out as the most appropriate 
theoretical framework in the field of security studies for this research project.
5
 
Developed by scholars associated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute 
(COPRI), the securitisation theory permits the study of the role of discourse and other 
social practices in the “process of presenting an issue in security terms” (Buzan and 
Hansen, 2009, p. 214). Given the centrality of discourse in the campaigns carried out by 
the anti-nuclear organisations, the theoretical foundation for the empirical analysis will 
draw upon the original work of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver on securitisation and more 
recent developments regarding the discursive construction of security. 
 
1.1 The anti-nuclear movement and the securitisation of nuclear weapons 
The history of the peace movement has been the subject of several outstanding 
books and the impact the “arms control transnational network” had upon international 
politics during the Cold War has been vastly researched and now constitutes a well-
established literature in the field of international relations.
6
 Nevertheless, a deep 
understanding of the advocacy of nuclear disarmament as an attempt to securitise 
nuclear weapons is yet to be presented. A renewed opportunity to do so occurred 
recently, after Buzan and Wæver (2009) revisited their original work and developed the 
concept of macrosecuritisation to better describe securitising moves that take place at 
the system level – “where the referent object is, in some sense, all of humankind” (p. 
254). The refinement of their previous framework suits the study of the anti-nuclear 
campaigns, in which nuclear abolition NGOs present the existence of nuclear weapons 
                                                 
5
 The concept of “securitisation” is in fact a neologism that was first used in the banking system and later 
transposed into international relations by Wæver. 
6
 For a great account of the history of the nuclear abolition movement, see the three volumes of Lawrence 
Wittner’s collection The struggle against the Bomb (Wittner 1993, 1997, 2003). On the arms control 
transnational network of the Cold War, see Adler (1992) and Risse-Kappen (1994).  
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as a threat to human survival. Buzan and Wæver (2009) actually mentioned the anti-
nuclear macrosecuritisation in their article, but they did so very briefly and always in 
the context of the Cold War security constellation (p.258).  
Admittedly, the prominence of the anti-nuclear movement and its potential for 
popular mobilisation decreased greatly in the 1990s. However, a modest revival of 
nuclear abolitionism has recently been experienced. The increasing number of 
newspaper articles and editorials, governmental publications and politicians’ statements 
urging action towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world is one of its strongest 
manifestations.
7
 The Wall Street Journal op-ed “A world free of nuclear weapons” 
(2007), signed by former US Secretaries of State George P. Shultz and Henry A. 
Kissinger, together with former Secretary of Defence William J. Perry and former 
Senator Sam Nunn, is commonly referred to as the starting point of this trend.
8
 In that 
article, the four statesmen argued that reliance on nuclear weapons for purposes of 
deterrence has become “increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective”. Taking this 
into account, they recognised the need to move towards “reversing reliance on nuclear 
weapons globally” and “ultimately ending them as a threat to the world” (Schultz, et al., 
2007).  
Other important political figures have since then incorporated the goal of nuclear 
disarmament in their rhetoric. Amid this new abolitionist wave, researchers at the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) acknowledged, in 2008, the 
emergence of “a broadening consensus around the world […] that more serious and 
effective arms control and disarmament measures should be implemented”. As a 
consequence, they expected an increasing number of high-level discussions and debates 
on the merits of arms control and disarmament in the immediate future (Bates, 2008, 
p.1).  
The prediction was borne out and various high-level workshops and panel 
debates did indeed occur in the past couple of years. This political configuration 
presented anti-nuclear NGOs with good opportunities to engage in opinion-building and 
policy-making processes, together with states and Inter-Governmental Organisations 
                                                 
7
 See Appendix 2 for a list compiling the most relevant of these publications supporting the goal of a 
nuclear-weapon-free world.  
8
 For supporting views, see the articles in the special edition of The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 17, 1, 
2010 and the texts published in Acton and Perkovich (eds.), 2009.  
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(IGOs). Trying to seize the nuclear disarmament momentum and transform this renewed 
interest into action, well-established nuclear abolition organisations joined forces and 
launched the “International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons” (ICAN), in 2007. 
These non-state actors also took this opportunity to review and update the Model 
Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) they had drafted in the mid-1990s, republishing it 
under the title Securing our Survival (SOS): the case for a Nuclear Weapons 
Convention. This fairly encouraging configuration allowed nuclear abolition NGOs to 
strengthen their call for a nuclear-weapon-free world inside multilateral fora, such as the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the NPT Review Conferences. These 
non-state actors defended the commencement of international negotiations on the NWC 
as a way of putting an end to the nuclear threat. 
Along with Buzan and Wæver’s new conceptual developments regarding 
macrosecuritisation, the re-emergence of nuclear disarmament as a topic for mainstream 
public debate presents a stimulating environment to carry out this research project. The 
aim of this dissertation is to examine the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War 
period, through the prism of the securitisation theory. Specifically, this study will 
investigate the NGO-led campaign for a NWC and its attempt to construe the existence 
of nuclear weapons as an existential threat to the survival of all humankind. By adopting 
a fresh perspective on the study of the anti-nuclear movement, this research is intended 
to provide a better understanding of the power of non-state actors in international 
politics and shed light on the possible instrumentality of securitisation as a way of 
raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action 
(Vuori, 2008, p. 76).  
The fact that earlier securitisation studies have mostly dealt with situations in 
which state actors are the securitisers does not constitute an impediment to the analysis 
that will be presented in this dissertation. On various occasions, Buzan and Wæver have 
emphasised that securitisation is not limited to states (Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 8; 24; 37). 
They have even approached empirical situations where non-state actors are the most 
common securitisers; for instance, in the case of the environmental sector (Buzan, et al., 
1998, p. 77). Nevertheless, the will to advance the study of non-state actors as leading 
securitisers is also a driving force behind this research project. 
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1.2 Methodology 
The initial work of the Copenhagen School on the securitisation theory has been 
highly praised for providing a relevant framework to study how security problems 
emerge, the processes through which some phenomena are elevated to the security 
agenda, and why other issues fail to be considered in the realm of security. Nonetheless, 
this contribution made by Wæver, Buzan and others scholars associated with COPRI 
did not go unchallenged. Several authors have identified problematic formulations, 
which has led to the emergence of numerous debates and controversies. These disputes 
have actually contributed to the prominence of the theory within the literature on 
security, while also revealing the absence of a consensual approach to securitisation. 
The major conceptual and political criticisms the securitisation theory has been 
subjected to are the topic of Chapter Two; which aims at elucidating the theoretical 
perspective that will guide the empirical analysis conducted in Chapter Four.  
Across the spectre of varying approaches to the study of securitisation processes, 
discourse analysis has been widely employed to identify patterns of representation and 
establish networks of meanings that are invariably present in the construction of threats. 
Following this established practice, discourse analysis will be conducted on the most 
central texts produced by the anti-nuclear NGOs advocating for the establishment of a 
NWC. This will be done with the purpose of understanding the process through which 
this specific public issue – the existence of nuclear weapons – becomes a security 
concern at the global level.  
In order to fully understand the discourse promoted by the securitiser, it is 
necessary to develop a comprehensive framework for analysis; one that takes into 
account the content of the discourses, but also includes the interlocutors of the speakers 
and the immediate and distal contexts. Therefore, a customised framework for analysis 
was developed so as to guide the discourse analysis of the selected dataset. Following 
Balzacq’s (2011b) suggestion, it comprises three different levels: agents, acts and 
context (p. 35). The first level encompasses the actors and relations that structure the 
securitisation, while the second accounts for the discursive and non-discursive practices 
that underwrite the securitisation and the third provides for the way contextual factors 
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can empower or disempower the securitising actors (Balzacq, 2011, p. 35; 36).
9
 This 
methodological construction is intended to facilitate the study of the anti-nuclear 
discourse promoted by the NGOs in this securitisation process. 
Guiding the empirical analysis is the conviction that the centrality of audience is 
best captured by disaggregating the relevant audience into different constitutions of 
actor and audience (Salter, 2008, p. 329; Balzacq, 2011a, p. 7). Following Salter’s 
classification (2008), it is possible to identify four main settings in which the anti-
nuclear securitising moves are presented: popular, elite, technocratic, and scientific (p. 
322). This setting-based approach to the empirical study of securitisation allows the 
security analyst to account for variations in the content and format of securitising moves 
carried out by the securitising actor. The moves may vary in accordance with the 
different settings, which include “the stage on which it is made, the genre in which it is 
made, the audience to which it is pitched, and the reception of the audience” (Salter, 
2008, p. 327).  
The empirical analysis will focus on the securitising moves carried out by the 
anti-nuclear movement in the most relevant and challenging setting of this particular 
process, the elite. This setting comprises the audience “whose attitude has a direct 
causal connection with the desired goals” (Balzacq, 2005, p. 185); that is, the national 
leaders and states’ representatives who have the formal power to start negotiations on a 
NWC. This empowering audience, which can enable the securitisers to adopt the 
proposed security measure, can be found in the sessions of the UNGA and in the NPT 
Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees. Given that the UNGA has played a 
significant role in advancing arms control and disarmament norms and since the NPT 
institutional bodies are responsible for the review of the Treaty’s operation and the 
promotion of its full implementation, they constitute the main stages of the elite setting 
in this particular securitisation.  
Video footage of presentations delivered by members of the selected NGOs, as 
well as written statements and documents submitted to sessions of the UNGA and the 
NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees will be the main source of data. 
The time frame analysed encompasses the period from 1997, when the draft NWC was 
circulated in the UNGA for the first time, to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. It is 
                                                 
9
 In this paper, securitiser and securitising actor are used interchangeably to refer to the actor who 
presents the securitising claim.  
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expected that this analysis will provide a map of how “patterns of representation which 
are constitutive of a threat” (Balzacq, 2011b, p. 39) have emerge and evolved in the 
years after the Cold War.  
 
1.3 Outline 
This dissertation analyses the anti-nuclear discourse promoted by non-state actors in the 
post-Cold War period, through the prism of securitisation theory.  
 
Chapter Two (Theoretical premise) examines the initial work of the Copenhagen School 
on the securitisation theory, as well as more recent studies on different securitisation 
processes. This chapter was designed to elucidate the theoretical perspective through 
which the anti-nuclear movement and the campaign for a NWC will be examined.  
 
Chapter Three (The anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War world) provides an 
overview of the security practices performed by the nuclear abolition movement in the 
1990s and 2000s. It demonstrates the feasibility of interpreting the struggle against the 
Bomb as an attempt to securitise the very existence of nuclear weapons.  
 
Chapter Four (Securitisation analysis in the elite setting) explains the methodology 
guiding the empirical analysis, as well as the general and specific findings obtained. The 
results confirmed that the anti-nuclear movement follows the particular grammar of 
security (existential threat, urgency, possible way out) when promoting securitising 
moves in the elite setting. It was possible to identify major factors that can empower or 
disempower their claims, as well as the strong points and weaknesses of their acts. 
 
Chapter Five (Conclusion) summarises the main findings and discusses this attempt at 
securitisation of nuclear weapons. Additionally, it provides directions for future 
research. 
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2. Securitisation theory  
The analysis that will be presented in Chapter Four makes use of the 
securitisation framework to examine the NGO-led campaign for the elimination of 
nuclear weapons through the establishment of a NWC. However, the theoretical input 
does not come only from the scholars associated with the Copenhagen School but also 
takes into account critiques and contributions made by several other authors; such as 
Balzacq (2005, 2011a, 2011b), Salter (2008) and Vaughn (2009). Blending the original 
work of Buzan and Wæver with more recent developments on the securitisation theory 
requires a careful examination of the weaknesses and the strengths of the different 
perspectives in question. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is not to tell the story of the 
securitisation theory so far, but to elucidate the perspective guiding the empirical 
analysis and to clarify contentious issues that are usually associated with the 
securitisation theory.  
Following a brief account of the origin of the securitisation theory, its main 
concepts and arguments will be presented. After that, the most important controversies 
and criticisms related to the theory will be addressed. Finally, new developments 
regarding macrosecuritisation and security constellations will be examined, since they 
are of crucial importance to the study of the anti-nuclear movement and the 
macrosecuritisation of nuclear weapons.  
 
2.1 The Copenhagen School 
Even prior to the end of the Cold War, the debate about deepening and widening 
the concept of security was already one of the most prominent discussions within 
international relations. On different occasions, Buzan and Wæver addressed this debate 
and expressed their opinions on some of the main controversial issues; such as the links 
between identity and security, as well as the sectorialisation of security (Buzan, 1983, 
1991; Buzan, et al., 1990; Wæver, et al. (eds.), 1990; Wæver, et al., 1993). When 
reviewing those publications, Bill McSweeney (1996) coined the term “Copenhagen 
School” to refer to the collective work of Buzan, Wæver and other scholars associated 
with COPRI (p.81).
10
 Since McSweeney first wrote about it, the Copenhagen School 
                                                 
10
 Although this collective designation may overlook the particularities of each scholar, the term became a 
common shorthand to refer to the work of Buzan and Wæver.  
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have further developed its views on security and became widely known for its original 
formulation of the securitisation theory. 
The articles “Securitization and desecuritization” (Wæver, 1995) and “European 
security identities” (Wæver, 1996), together with the monograph Security: a new 
framework for analysis (Buzan, et al., 1998; hereafter Security), can be considered the 
core of the securitisation theory, as they contain the most relevant formulations that 
have informed Buzan and Wæver’s work since then. Combining realism with post-
structuralism (Williams, 2003), securitisation theory received criticisms from different 
theoretical and political perspectives when it first appeared. Many years later, the 
securitisation framework continues to be surrounded by controversies. Although 
different scholars have identified inconsistencies in the work of the Copenhagen School, 
that did not lead to the discredit of the securitisation theory as a whole. In reality, most 
of the critics of the theory have recognised its importance and, thus, proposed solutions 
for the problems they discovered. The various debates and controversies have actually 
contributed to the continued prominence of the securitisation theory within security 
studies. At the same time, these more or less independent critical assessments have 
exposed the lack of a consensual approach to the study of securitisation.  
 
2.2 Security and securitisation 
Inspired by developments in the field of the philosophy of language, Wæver has 
emphasised in his writings the discursive aspect of the construction of security. In view 
of that, he proposed that security be considered as a speech act, a self-referential 
discursive practice: “in this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to 
something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as 
in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)” (Wæver, 1995, p. 55). This 
conceptualisation of security is markedly influenced by J. L. Austin’s studies on the 
power of language and his formulations regarding speech acts and performative 
utterances. According to Austin, in addition to constative statements - which merely 
describe a given reality -, there are the performative ones; that is, utterances that are 
capable of performing an action (Austin, 1962).
11
 Following Austin, Wæver argued that 
                                                 
11
 The “I do” uttered by the bride and groom during the lawful marriage ceremony is one example of a 
performative speech act, since by uttering those words something is done (Austin, 1962, p. 5). Other 
common examples are the ones mentioned by Wæver: betting, giving a promise, naming a ship.  
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the power of language in fulfilling an action and transforming a situation could also be 
seen in the domain of security. Thus, he affirmed that by labelling “issues and 
developments as ‘security’ problems”, an actor could transform the way those issues 
and developments were perceived and, consequently, acted upon (Wæver, 1995, p. 75). 
Considering that only constative statements can have their content analysed in 
terms of veracity, security as a performative speech act can neither be true or false 
(Taureck, 2006, p. 7). Because “security is a quality actors inject into issues” (Buzan, et 
al., 1998, p. 204), it cannot be understood in objective terms. For that reason, the 
Copenhagen School abdicates any pretensions of objectively identifying security 
threats. The “defining criterion of security is textual” (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 176); so, 
security analysts should not concern themselves with whether the security issues that 
constitute threats are real or not. In this sense, the power of security lies in its internal, 
linguistic-grammatical structure. It follows that external, contextual and social factors 
are relegated to a marginal position in the Copenhagen School’s framework; being 
considered in the realm of the facilitating conditions “under which the speech act works 
in contrast to cases in which the act misfires or is abused” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32).12  
As a linguistic practice, security constitutes “a specific way of framing an issue” 
(Wæver, 1996, p. 106, emphasis added). For that reason, security analysts should be 
able to identify the specificity of security; its very own “securityness”. With this in 
mind, Wæver sought to find out the specific grammar of security, searching for the key 
meanings that were present whenever an issue was being framed in terms of security. 
He noticed that the general sense of the concept of security was actually tied to the idea 
of national security (1995, p. 68).
13
 Moreover, the distinctive quality of security 
problems were “urgency; state power claiming the legitimate use of extraordinary 
means; a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing the 
political ‘we’ from dealing with any other questions” (1995, p. 70). From these 
                                                 
12
 Facilitating conditions are causal (but not determinant) mechanisms in the securitisation theory. They 
mainly refer to the influence of the social capital of the enunciator, whether he/she is in a position of 
authority (not necessarily official authority) and particular features of the alleged threat and the referent 
object (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 33).  
13
 According to Wæver, traditionally, security refers to national security. In this sense, he states: “There is 
no literature, no philosophy, no tradition of "security" in non-state terms; it is only as a critical idea, 
played out against the concept and practices of state security, that other threats and referents have any 
meaning” (Wæver, 1995, p. 68). This is a central aspect of the Copenhagen School and it is possible to 
spot elements of the national logic of security in the emphasis Wæver and Buzan usually place on 
authority, threats, enemies and emergency measures. Williams (2003), among others, has identified this 
characteristic as a deriving from Carl Schmitt’s work.  
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observations, it was possible to deduce that framing an issue in security terms would 
traditionally entail a state actor arguing that such issue represented an existential threat 
to the self-determination and sovereignty of the political unit and, thus, the state should 
be granted the power to adopt extraordinary measures that could tackle the threat 
(Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 21). 
The situation just described depicts a case of securitisation - the process through 
which something is constituted as a security issue; that is, it is securitised. 
Conventionally, governments and state officials have played the role of the securitising 
actor, who claims special powers to protect the right to survival of the political unit. The 
securitisation theory, however, was designed to allow the study of a broader security 
agenda, one that goes beyond the state-centric thinking that has for long characterised 
the field of international relations. Accordingly, the framework proposed by the 
Copenhagen School admits the possibility of the emergence of non-traditional threats, 
coming from sectors other than the military.
14
 Another innovative feature of the 
securitisation framework is its ability to accommodate non-state actors that participate 
actively in international politics and might even act in the capacity of the securitiser 
(Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p. 12).
15
  
It follows that the securitisation process can be described as a relatively open 
one; where a securitising actor stages an issue on the political arena, before the relevant 
audience. As a rule, that is done in a specific way. Following the grammar of security, 
the securitiser argues that the issue in question poses an existential threat to a referent 
object that has a legitimate claim to survival. The securitising actor also points to the 
urgency of tackling such issue; after all, “if we do not tackle this problem, everything 
else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in 
                                                 
14
 The Copenhagen School often adopts a sectorial approach to the study of security. They argue that 
sectors are important as analytical devices, which enable the security analyst to differentiate distinct types 
of interaction. Sectors are defined as “views of international system through a lens that highlights one 
particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all of its constituent units”, (Buzan, et. al., 
1993, p. 27). In international relations, there is the following division (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 7): 
1. military (relationships of forceful coercion) 
2. political (relationships of authority, governing status and recognition) 
3. economic (relationships of trade, production and finance) 
4. societal sector (relationships of collective identity) 
5. environmental sector (relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere) 
15
 Even though it is true that states have been the actors historically endowed with security tasks (Buzan, 
et al., 1998, p.37), this does not configure an absolute impediment to non-state actors playing the role of 
the securitiser.  
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our own way)” (Buzan, et. al, 1998, p. 24).16 He or she then promptly presents a 
solution to the alleged security problem; which often involves the adoption of extreme 
measures.  
Interestingly enough, in this discursive process of labelling an issue as a security 
threat, the securitising actor does not actually have to use the word security (Buzan, et. 
al, 1998, p. 33). In reality, the securitiser constructs his or her argument in conformity 
with the specific rhetorical structure of securitisation (existential threat, sense of 
urgency, a possible way out) with or without having to say the “s-word”. This 
discursive articulation is intended to convince the relevant audience to agree with the 
proposed measures. If the securitising claims are accepted by the relevant audience, then 
it is possible to state that the alleged threat has been securitised (Buzan, et. al., 1998, pp. 
27; 31).  
At this point it is possible to identify two of the most problematic formulations 
of the Copenhagen School with regards to the securitisation process; namely, the fixed 
meaning of security and the lack of concrete criteria to evaluate whether or not a 
securitisation has been put in place. Despite statements in favour of an open approach to 
the concept of security, the identification of security with the survival in the face of 
existential threats prevails in Security (Ciută, 2009, p. 307). As a consequence, the 
meaning of security is established a priori, preventing the Copenhagen School from 
exploring the “relational dynamics of the social and political process of generating 
meaning” (Stritzel, 2007, p. 367). The theory proposed by Buzan, et al., does not enable 
the analyst to grasp contextual variations in the concept of security. Moreover, it does 
not take into account the self-understanding of actors with regards to the meaning of 
security. As Ciută (2009) has argued, whatever the actors label as security must be taken 
into consideration, even if it does not conform to the Copenhagen School’s pre-
established definition of security. 
With regard to the establishment of a successful securitisation, one cannot find 
in the Copenhagen School framework firm standards that indicate whether or not a 
securitisation has been put in place. In Security, there are passages in which the authors 
state that the securitising claims must be accepted by the relevant audience and 
exceptional measures must be adopted so that a securitisation can be achieved (Buzan, 
                                                 
16
 It is important to note the use of the pronoun “we”, since securitisation is always about collectivities 
and, thus, it often involves social identities.  
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et. al., 1998, p. 26). Nevertheless, on other occasions, Buzan, et al. (1998), lower their 
standards, affirming that the permission to “break free of the normal procedures and 
rules” already signifies that a securitisation has been accomplished (p. 25). In one of 
these confusing statements, the authors affirm that “the exact definition and criteria of 
securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat 
with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” (p. 25). They, however, 
do not explore the dynamics of this intersubjective process, nor do they elaborate on 
what their understandings of “normal political procedures”, “relevant audience” and 
“substantial political effects” are. This might be a conscious decision, since all these 
categories can be considered case dependent and establishing rigid parameters would 
perhaps make the securitisation framework impractical. Yet, the absence of a frame for 
how securitisations are successful or fail has led to disparate understandings of what the 
construction of a threat image exactly entails.  
Despite these problems, the Copenhagen School has to be praised for providing 
a relevant framework to study how security problems emerge, the processes through 
which some phenomena are elevated to the security agenda, and why other issues fail to 
be considered in the realm of security. Moreover, this same framework can be of value 
when the inverse process is the object of study; that is, when the focus is placed on the 
desecuritisation of a given issue. In such cases, the issue is removed from the 
emergency mode of security into the “normal bargaining process of the political 
sphere”, not being framed in threat-defence terms anymore (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 04; 
p. 29).  
Even though the Copenhagen School is not categorical on this regard, it is 
evident that in both securitisation and desecuritisation processes the securitising actor 
and the audience act together. In the construction of a given issue as a threat and in the 
opposite case of removing it from the sphere of security, the endorsement of the 
relevant audience is of crucial importance. In order to create shared understandings of 
threat perception and security, both the securitiser and the audience take part in one 
dynamic process, permeated by relations of power and the politics of negotiation, 
arguing and persuasion. Therefore, it is possible to see securitisation as an inter-
subjective process; in which “the security act is negotiated between the securitiser and 
the audience” (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 26).  
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Constructing a security issue, however, cannot be simultaneously a self-
referential practice and an intersubjective process. Nevertheless, that is how it is 
depicted by the Copenhagen School. Adding to this confusion is the fact that, on several 
occasions, Buzan and Wæver use the terms security and securitisation interchangeably 
(Ciută, 2009, p. 312). These problematic formulations concerning the concept of 
security have ultimately led to different understandings of the securitisation process. To 
be precise, whether one agrees with the self-referential quality of security or decides to 
focus on its intersubjective character will greatly affect his or her perspective on 
securitisation (Balzacq, 2011a). 
 
2.3 Two main approaches to securitisation  
Balzacq (2011a) has identified two main approaches to securitisation; namely, 
the philosophical and the sociological.
17
 While the first one is centred on the 
formulation of security as a speech act, the sociological variant draws more extensively 
on insights provided by authors associated with sociological studies – such as Bourdieu 
and Foucault.
18
 Separating these two views of securitisation are different perspectives 
on significant issues; chiefly, (1) the idea of security as a speech act, (2) the role of the 
audience and (3) the importance of external and contextual aspects.  
The philosophical approach is marked by its emphasis on the linguistic elements 
of the discursive practices of security. It is also characterised by the reliance on the 
speech act theory, which is often related to a diminished attention to the role of the 
audience. Similarly, the insistency on the self-referential character of security has led 
this particular perspective to downplay the importance of external and contextual 
aspects in the process of framing something in security terms (Balzacq, 2011a).  
Balzacq argues that the predominance of the textual aspects of securitisation 
over the contextual and social ones in the analytical framework established in Security 
shows that the Copenhagen School’s perspective on security and securitisation is closer 
to this philosophical variant. Characteristically, the framework developed by Buzan, et 
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 Stritzel (2007) proposed a similar classification, referring to the two variants as internalist and 
externalist readings of securitization. 
18
 It is important to observe, as Balzacq accurately did, that these two poles are ideal-types and, thus, most 
actual researches will in fact be located somewhere in between the two categories. It should also be noted 
that not all studies that deal with securitisation theory make clear their perspective on the contentious 
issues. Frequently, it is up to the reader to grasp the author’s view on these questions.  
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al. (1998), includes three units for security analysis: referent objects; securitising actors, 
functional actors (p. 36). As Balzacq (2011b) observed, audience and the context are 
excluded from this scheme (p.35).  
In fact, due to its internal contradictions, it should be possible to place the 
Copenhagen School in both perspectives. Nonetheless, the internalist focus prevails in 
Buzan and Wæver’s writings. Additionally, their approach to securitisation is mainly 
focused on discursive practices and written and spoken utterances are the most 
privileged source of data. The external, contextual and social dimensions are only 
briefly explored; usually, in the realm of facilitating conditions of the speech act. Amid 
vagueness, ambiguities and contradictions, the crucial role of the audience remains 
underdeveloped and undertheorised in Buzan and Wæver’s work (Léonard and Kaunert, 
2011, p. 59).  
The sociological approach to securitisation does not deny the importance of 
linguistic elements and the grammar of security in the construction of security 
problems. In fact, most of the authors that are close to this perspective praised the 
Copenhagen School’s contribution to the study of what Bourdieu have referred to as the 
“almost magical power” of words (Bourdieu, 1984 cited in Balzacq 2011a, p. 03). 
However, some of these scholars argued that the inability to take into account the 
significance of the external and social aspects of the securitisation process can have 
misleading consequences. For instance, the sole analysis of the security utterances 
voiced by the securitising actor can give the false impression that the linguistic content 
of a text can, invariably, modify a context. In this sense, it is imperative to avoid 
overstating the power of words. As Balzacq (2005) has noted, 
 
For one, language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of 
it. Moreover, it is not theoretically useful nor is it empirically credible to hold 
that what we say about a problem would determine its essence. For instance, 
what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence (p. 181). 
 
Balzacq does not reject the assumption that security problems might be 
successfully constructed through language games. Yet, he considers the speech act 
formulation an inadequate basis for the securitisation theory. According to him, a more 
sophisticated analytical frame is necessary; one that allows for the study of situations 
where not only discursive but also non-discursive events can influence the construction 
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of a threat. In this sense, Balzacq (2005) argues that securitisation should be considered 
as a pragmatic act, “a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a 
configuration of circumstances” (p. 172). Fighting against the primacy of content over 
context, he proposes an integrative framework; in which the audience and its reactions 
to the staging of the alleged threat, as well as the particular features of the object, are 
more than just facilitating conditions. Elements internal to the speech are considered 
together with “the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the 
power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction” (Balzacq, 2005, p. 172).   
In his conceptualisation of security as a pragmatic act, Balzacq points to the 
importance of heuristic artefacts that can be employed by the securitising actor; such as 
metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes and emotions. 
Elaborating on the framework proposed by the Copenhagen School, his formulation 
incorporates extra-linguistic resources to the analysis of securitisation processes. 
Moreover, Balzacq’s approach to security offers more sophisticated tools to the study of 
securitisation, as it considers the power of the dispositif
19
 and the structuring force of 
practices
20
 that are part of the construction of security.  
Emphasising the centrality of practices in the discursive construction of security, 
Balzacq drew attention to repeated, routinised types of behaviours, which are present in 
everyday politics. Observing empirical cases of securitisation, it is possible to see that 
securitisers do not necessarily resort to the terminology of exception or emergency. As 
Balzacq, et al., (2010) has noted, securitising claims are often “repeated, rooted in 
(liberal) traditions, in routinized practices of everyday politics, in calls for freedom and 
democracy”. Moving away from the problematic notion of exceptionality, Balzacq 
strengthened the empirical potential of securitisation theory, integrating the processes of 
securitisation and policy-making in a smoothly manner. 
Like Balzacq, most scholars associated with the sociological variant of 
securitisation studies consider the contextual and social aspects of securitisation to be of 
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 Balzacq adopts Foucault’s definition, according to which a dispositif is “a thoroughly heterogeneous 
ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in 
short, the said as much as the unsaid. The dispositif itself is the systems of relations that can be 
established between these elements” (Foucault, 1980 cited in Balzacq, 2011a, p. 29, fn 27).  
20
 Balzacq quotes Andreas Reckwitz’s definition of practices as “a routinized type of behaviour which 
consists of several elements, interconnected to one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental 
activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding and know-how, 
states of emotion and motivational knowledge” (Reckwitz, 2002 cited in Balzacq 2011a, p. 15). 
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major relevance. Moreover, they place at the centre of their analysis the intersubjective 
practices of securitisation, through which securitising actors and the relevant 
audience(s) assign meaning to the issues in question. Most empirical studies have not 
only focused on the content of discursive securitising moves, but have also considered 
how these moves are presented and how the target audience responds to them. From this 
sociological perspective, it has been possible to gain valuable knowledge regarding the 
impact of the immediate contextual settings on the use of language; the types of 
audiences and its different roles; and the difficulties of speaking “security” in non-
democratic societies (see Hansen, 2000; Wilkinson, 2007; Roe, 2008; Barthwal-Datta, 
2009).  
 
2.4 Buzan and Wæver on the global level: macrosecuritisation and security 
constellations 
Throughout the years, Buzan and Wæver have employed the securitisation 
framework in studies mainly concerned with regional security dynamics. Already in 
Security, Buzan, et al. (1998), presented arguments supporting research focused on the 
regional level, stating that “the middle scale of limited collectivities has proved the most 
amenable to securitisation as durable referent objects” (1998, p. 36). Arguing that issues 
seen as a menace to objects located at the middle level (states, nations, religions, clans, 
etc.) would get securitised more easily than the ones situated at the individual or the 
system level, Buzan and Wæver decided to investigate the existence of durable sets of 
securitisations at the regional level. The result of such venture was the monograph 
Regions and Powers: the structure of international security (2003); in which they also 
sought to update the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT).  
Later, however, Buzan and Wæver realised that the study of securitisation 
processes that involved referent objects placed at the system level had been somewhat 
neglected. Despite the difficulties in securitising issues that are depicted as a menace to 
larger collectivities (the humankind, the ecosystem, the Earth), the importance of these 
higher order securitisations in the global structure of security should not be overlooked. 
Since the end of the Cold War, Buzan and Wæver had considered regional dynamics as 
the most relevant ones (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p.10), but recent events demonstrated 
that security interactions at the system level were becoming increasingly prominent 
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again. The efforts regarding the American-led “Global War on Terrorism” (GWoT) and 
the growing visibility of the transnational environmental movement motivated these 
authors to conduct a modest revision of their original framework, adjusting it to the 
study of higher-level securitisations.  
The title of Buzan and Wæver’s new article, “Macrosecuritisation and security 
constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory” (hereafter 
“Macrosecuritisation”), was pretty accurate, as it limited the scope of their revision to 
one element: scale. Even though the authors acknowledged the emergence of different 
controversies originating from their past publications, they made it clear that it was not 
the objective of this new text to address whatever criticisms they had received. Buzan 
and Wæver reiterated their commitment to the basic understanding of securitisation, 
referring to “Securitization and Desecuritization” (1995) and Security (1998), and 
informed the reader that their position on the relevant contentious issues was soon to be 
presented in two forthcoming publications.
21
 
  In “Macrosecuritisation”, the authors adopted a slightly critical approach to refer 
to their previous focus on the regional level. Buzan and Wæver (2009) stated that 
elements of realist thinking were evident in the predominance of states and national 
security concerns in what could be considered “an egotistical model of security” (p. 
256). Although this model came close to reality, it was not appropriate to analyse 
particular occasions when over-arching international security problems dominated the 
global structure of security. To remedy this weakness, They proposed the concept of 
macrosecuritisation, to explain securitisations on behalf of referent objects that are 
located at levels higher than the middle one and “which aim to incorporate and 
coordinate multiple lower level securitisations” (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 257).  
As it could be anticipated, these higher order securitisations share many of the 
features that characterise lower level ones. Macrosecuritisations also require securitising 
actors, which mobilise different resources, with the purpose of constructing a specific 
issue as a threat, on behalf of a referent object and before the relevant audience(s). 
Nonetheless, due to their particular macro quality, macrosecuritisations usually establish 
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 The two books, which have not yet been published, are:  Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde, 
The Politics of Security: The Securitization Framework of Analysis (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 
forthcoming); Ole Wæver, 'The Meta-politics of Theorising: Desecuritization, Responsibility and Action 
in Speech Act Theories of Security”, forthcoming.  
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hierarchical relations with other securitisations; possibly, incorporating or coordinating 
them. Another distinguishing feature of macrosecuritisations is that, when powerful, 
they can “operate as the interpretive framework for other securitisations” (2009, p. 265). 
This was the case during the Cold War, when security concerns at lower levels were re-
articulated and framed in terms of the East-West conflict. 
 In order to properly identify a macrosecuritisation, one can compare it to other 
lower level securitisations, according to three different criteria. The obvious one regards 
the level of the referent object: individual, group, unit, civilisational, system or global. 
A second aspect for comparison refers to comprehensiveness; that is, the extent to 
which the macrosecuritisation effectively reaches and structures securitisations in 
different sectors. According to this criterion, different degrees of comprehensiveness 
will determine whether the securitisation is a niche, a partial or an inclusive one. A third 
point for consideration would be the degree of success achieved by the macro-
securitisation, which can be evaluated in accordance to the level of support 
demonstrated by the relevant audience. Buzan and Wæver (2009) carefully point out 
that the degree of success does not strictly determine “whether something is a 
macrosecuritisation or not, but whether it is a powerful one” (p. 259). Again, the authors 
avoid establishing firm standards that determine whether or not a securitisation has been 
put in place. Instead, they propose that the analyst observe the power of a securitisation 
indirectly, assessing the impact it has on security constellations.  
 The idea of constellations had already figured in other texts of the authors 
associated with the Copenhagen School; usually, in the context of RSCT. Nonetheless, 
in “Macrosecuritisation” the concept is re-examined from a macro perspective. In this 
sense, the authors refer to constellations as sets of interlinked securitisations and their 
respective cross-levels, cross-sectors relations. Thus, it becomes clear that constellations 
are generated by macrosecuritisations, which structure and organise interdependent 
securitisations (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 259). Therefore, the study of security 
constellations permits the security analyst to see the “bigger picture”; that is, the large 
scale patterns of interlinked securitisations. In some occasions, these patterns are 
marked by the existence of a powerful macrosecuritisation, which incorporates and/or 
frames many of the lower level securitisations. Through such processes, 
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macrosecuritisations can generate system-spanning constellations - as it was the case of 
the Cold War (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 268). 
Yet, establishing powerful macrosecuritisations can be quite expensive and 
involve strenuous efforts. Political capital and other sorts of resources are employed by 
the securitising actors in different practices that can contribute to the construction of a 
threat. In the case of macrosecuritisations, Buzan and Wæver argue that the creation of 
universalist ideologies, embracing strong political claims, facilitates the establishment 
and maintenance of the threat image. Since these universalist beliefs provide a basis for 
the creation and reinforcement of core identities, they also make the construction of 
shared understandings and shared threat perceptions possible. Not surprisingly, 
universalisms play a big part in the process of winning over the relevant audiences - 
domestic and international ones. Based on the main argument in which the ideology is 
rooted, Buzan and Wæver (2009) identified four types of universalisms: inclusive, 
exclusive, existing order universalism and physical threat universalism (pp. 260-61). 
They argued that each kind of universalism influences the dynamics of the 
macrosecuritisation and their respective constellations different ways. The anti-nuclear 
macrosecuritisation of the Cold War, for instance, was based on a variant of physical 
threat universalisms, since the securitising actors argued that nuclear weapons posed a 
threat to the physical fate of humanity (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p.261). In this case, 
particular features of the alleged threat, such as its unparalleled power of destruction 
and its indiscriminate nature, underpinned a securitisation that could eventually achieve 
full-scale.  
 
2.5 Macrosecuritisation of nuclear weapons 
 Although Buzan and Wæver addressed the anti-nuclear movement and the 
securitisation of nuclear weapons in “Macrosecuritisation”, they did it briefly and only 
in the context of the Cold War. They addressed the current securitising moves 
connected to the GWoT and the securitising discourse of the contemporary 
environmental movement, but ignored the new abolitionist wave, given the reader the 
impression that anti-nuclear securitising moves are weak or non-existent in the present. 
Remarkably, the anti-nuclear securitisation was experiencing one of its high points at 
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the same time that “Macrosecuritisation” was being published, in April 2009. It was on 
9 April 2009 that President Obama delivered his “Prague Speech”, stating that:   
 
The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of 
the Cold War […] Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those 
weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of a global nuclear war 
has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up […] And no matter 
where it happens, there is no end to what the consequences might be – for our 
global safety, our security, our society, our economy, to our ultimate survival 
[…] So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to 
seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons (The White 
House, 2009).  
 
Far more prominently than ever before in the post-Cold War period, nuclear 
weapons have since 2007 been depicted by top-rank politicians and high-level state 
officials as a threat to the survival of humankind. But Buzan and Wæver are not 
concerned with this modest revival of the anti-nuclear movement. In the context of the 
Cold War, the authors approached the anti-nuclear securitisation from the perspective of 
the activists who have been advocating for nuclear disarmament ever since the first 
bomb was dropped, in 1945. From this point of view, Buzan and Wæver (2009) stated 
that “oppositional civil society groups” were the main carriers of this 
macrosecuritisation (p. 270) and, thus, provided an innovative account of the anti-
nuclear movement during the Cold War. According to them, anti-nuclear securitisers 
construed the threat of nuclear weapons in connection with other security concerns, like 
the devastation of the environment caused by nuclear tests and the danger of war 
between the rival superpowers. Connecting various concerns pertinent to discrete 
sectors, the anti-nuclear movement was capable of establishing an inclusive 
macrosecuritisation (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 259).  
From the viewpoint of nuclear non-proliferation, this was a relatively successful 
macrosecuritisation; nuclear proliferation was established as a threat and arms control 
mechanisms and the NPT regime were put in place to avoid this problem. Evidently, the 
anti-nuclear movement was not the only actor interested in preventing proliferation. At 
the same time that non-proliferation represented the “genuine fear that the spread of 
nuclear weapons would increase the chance of them being used”, it also had a strong 
appeal to the two superpowers, who sought to maintain their privilege status and 
military preeminence (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 270). From the perspective of 
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disarmament, however, the anti-nuclear movement was not able to convince the relevant 
audience that outlawing and eliminating nuclear weapons configured an appropriate 
solution to the nuclear threat. Taking these mixed results into account, Buzan and 
Wæver (2009) provided the general picture of this securitisation, affirming that: 
 
Compared to the dominant securitisation pattern of the Cold War, securitisation 
of nuclear weapons, though aiming at universality, was much less widely held 
[…] But it nevertheless represented a durable and in some ways influential 
minority macrosecuritisation with an active global following (p. 270). 
 
Although succinct, this assessment of the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation of the 
Cold War is of enormous importance for several reasons. Remarkably, it signified a 
change of posture towards the securitisation of nuclear weapons. Before this article, 
Buzan and Wæver had only mentioned the securitisation of nuclear weapons in 
situations where states were the securitising actor and proliferation in specific countries 
was in fact the issue being constructed as a threat (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 55; Buzan and 
Wæver, 2003, p. 13). The focus on the global level allowed the authors to see the 
securitising efforts made by the anti-nuclear movement that, until then, had been 
overlooked by the literature on securitisation. In “Macrosecuritisation”, Buzan and 
Wæver not only confirmed that securitisation is a process that can take place at every 
level but they also strengthened the claim that non-state actors can effectively play the 
role of the securitisers. As a result, they inaugurated a new perspective on the study of 
the anti-nuclear movement, asserting the feasibility of examining the nuclear abolition 
discourse as an attempt to securitise the existence of nuclear weapons.  
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3. The securitisation of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world 
 
3.1 Global security dynamics in the post-Cold War  
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to the East-West conflict and 
the ideological rivalry that had underpinned the bipolar power structure. According to 
Buzan and Wæver (2009), the end of the Cold War was “a massive act of 
macrodesecuritisation”, which led to the extinction of the security constellation that had 
been generated by the two rival macrosecuritisations (p. 270). As for the perceived 
threat posed by nuclear weapons, it was largely diluted amid the wave of general 
optimism that became apparent in international relations during the early 1990s. As the 
United States and the recently established Russian Federation reaffirmed their 
commitment to the arms control mechanisms previously established, the “Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty" was finally signed, in July 1991. Known as START I, this 
bilateral treaty had been in negotiation for years and its signings and posterior 
ratifications represented a significant reduction in the number of strategic nuclear 
weapons deployed by the two former enemies.  
Cooperative patterns of relations that started to emerge between the US and 
Russia, together with other initiatives aimed at decreasing the militarisation of 
international relations that had characterised the Cold War, contributed to the decreasing 
of public fears of nuclear annihilation. This trend was also evident among politicians, 
scientists and anti-nuclear activists. The Doomsday Clock, for instance, was reset in 
1991, stating that there were seventeen minutes to midnight (Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 1991). Since its creation, in 1947, this indicator of the nuclear danger had 
never depicted a more optimistic situation. In fact, the time stated by the Clock’s hands 
in 1991 is actually the best scenario this symbolic device has ever portrayed.
22
  
The macrodesecuritisation that occurred when the Cold War ended meant that 
most of the global issues that used to be dealt with in terms of security had to be 
reframed; perhaps, in terms other than threat-defence. Initiatives such as the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction and the denuclearisation of the newly independent states 
of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were indicative of this new trend in international 
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 The timeline of the Doomsday Clock is available online, at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
http://www.thebulletin.org/content/doomsday-clock/timeline [Accessed on 20 April 2011].  
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relations. Following a practice that was characteristic of the anti-nuclear movement, the 
Defence Ministers of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States planted sunflowers and 
scattered seeds where missiles used to be stationed; during a ceremony at the Ukrainian 
base of Pervomaisk, in 1996. Such gesture could be read as a desecuritising move, 
complemented by the words of US Secretary of Defence, William J. Perry: “sunflowers 
instead of missiles planted in the soil will ensure peace for future generations” (Perlez, 
1996). 
In the absence of the larger framework of the Cold War macrosecuritisation 
outranking lower level securitisations, the relative autonomy of security dynamics at the 
regional level was expected to increase. Likewise, a significant diversification of the 
issues and sectors involved in the security dynamics would probably follow suit. For 
instance, questions of identity became increasingly central to securitisations and 
featured prominently among local and national security dynamics in the post-Cold War 
world (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 272). At the global level, it was still possible to spot 
some securitising moves. In the economic sector, for example, the world economy and 
the so-called “Washington consensus” were being debated in terms of global security by 
both proponents and opponents of the liberal trading and financial orders (Buzan and 
Wæver, 2009, p. 271). Additionally, global securitising moves carried out by the 
transnational environmental movement were becoming stronger and, thus, more visible. 
Nonetheless, security dynamics in the environmental sector would become more 
prominent in the 2000s; interestingly enough, that would happen concomitantly to the 
revival of the anti-nuclear movement.
23
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 2007 was also an extraordinary year for the securitisation of climate change, as the global climate rose 
to a general status of international security issue. In April that year, the UN Security Council discussed 
for the first time ever the potential impact of climate change on peace and security. It was also in 2007 
that the Bush Administration linked energy security to climate change, recognising the military 
importance of both (Floyd, 2010, p. 159). Symptomatically, the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Al Gore “for their efforts to build up and 
disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the 
measures that are needed to counteract such change” (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2007).   
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3.2 The anti-nuclear movement and the securitisation of nuclear weapons in the 1990s 
and the 2000s 
The intensification of international negotiations concerning arms control 
agreements and reductions in the nuclear arsenal of the Cold War did not necessarily 
mean that steps towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons were being taken. As 
the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) continued to include nuclear deterrence in their 
defence doctrines, the wave of optimism that followed the end of the Cold War soon 
turned into disappointment. It became clear to nuclear abolition activists that none of 
the NWS considered nuclear disarmament a viable option. Moreover, the persistence of 
vertical and horizontal proliferation, as well as the inability to put an end to nuclear 
testing, reminded the anti-nuclear movement of how distant the world was from nuclear 
abolition. 
Despite the lessening of international tensions and the decrease in popular 
mobilisation, peace activists and nuclear abolition organisations continued to lobby for 
nuclear disarmament. By different means, nuclear abolition activists and NGOs 
continued to draw attention to the dangers posed by the very existence of nuclear 
weapons. Considering the nuclear threat an urgent question, a matter of life and death to 
all humanity, these abolitionists conducted campaigns and staged demonstrations that 
were charged with securitising claims. In order to tackle this problem, the anti-nuclear 
movement suggested that different steps be taken, all leading to the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons. According to them, time to act was always “now”; otherwise, 
proliferation would continue to take place. In the nuclear abolition discourse, an 
increased number of nuclear weapons represented a bigger chance they would be used – 
destroying “whole cities, populations, countries or even civilisation” (Hill, 2007).  
The most notorious campaign of the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold 
War period certainly refers to the fight against nuclear tests, which was seen as one 
important step in the direction of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Throughout the 1980s 
and the 1990s, it was possible to spot demonstrations and petitions in favour of a 
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comprehensive nuclear test ban all over the world.
24
 In areas near test sites, for instance 
in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, claims of radioactive contamination coming from nuclear 
test venting mobilised large crowds to stage anti-nuclear protests. The worrying health 
and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing were presented in connection with 
the Soviet rule over Kazakhstan and the political influence of the nuclear establishment. 
Putting together these different concerns, it was possible to create a strong, grass-roots 
movement in Kazakhstan, even before the country was declared independent from the 
USSR. In fact, it was due to popular pressures that the Soviet cabinet minister 
responsible for the environment, announced in 1991 that the test site at Semipalatinsk, 
in Kazakhstan, was “for all practical purposes not working any more” (Nikolai 
Vorontsov cited in Wittner, 2003, p. 438).  
The Soviet Union and then Russia observed a test moratorium starting from 
January 1991. On 8 April 1992, President Mitterrand announced the temporary halting 
of French tests. In the US, the test moratorium came with a piece of legislation that had 
been promoted by peace groups, along with the Democratic leadership, and it was 
finally approved by the Congress and sanctioned by the President in 1992. In addition to 
establishing a nine-month moratorium, the so-called “Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell 
Amendment” placed further restrictions on future tests and called for negotiations on the 
test-ban-treaty to be completed by no later than 1996 (Wittner, 2003, p. 460). For as 
long as the Americans observed the moratorium, the UK would also refrain from 
testing, as the British relied on the American test site in Nevada for its own nuclear 
explosions.  
When the recently installed President Clinton announced that he would extend 
the US test moratorium, he also pledged to begin a consultative process with Russia and 
other states, aimed at commencing negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at an early 
date (The White House, 1993). In this context, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) - a 
multilateral disarmament negotiating forum serviced by the UN Secretariat in Geneva - 
gave its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to begin negotiations on 
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 The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) - which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space 
and under water - had been signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom and 
came into effect in 1963. Underground tests, however, continued to be conducted by these countries. 
France and China did not sign the PTBT and carried out atmospheric testing until 1974 and 1980 
respectively. See Fedchenko and Ferm Hellgren (2007) for an overview of nuclear explosions conducted 
worldwide between 1945 and 2006. 
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the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) in January 1994. These 
negotiations were also the subject of the forty-eighth session of the UNGA, which 
passed a resolution calling on the CD to proceed with the CTBT negotiations as rapidly 
as possible (UN General Assembly, 1993).  
Oblivious to these developments, China continued with its test programme, 
conducting several nuclear explosions between 1992 and 1996. Even though the 
Chinese posture on this matter was strongly condemned by the anti-nuclear movement 
and the public in general, it was the French plan to resume testing in the Pacific that 
unleashed what the Washington Post called a “Typhoon of Anger” (Drozdiak, 1995; 
Wittner, 2009, p. 210). When France interrupted its moratorium and conducted five 
underground tests in 1995 and another one in 1996, anti-nuclear protests sprang all 
around the world. In addition to large demonstrations that occurred in the French and 
Tahitian capitals, consumers in different parts of the globe boycotted French goods. As 
Wittner (2009) recounted:  
 
Australian unions refused to handle French cargo or French postal and 
telecommunication services. Sales of French wines and champagne plummeted 
in Australia and New Zealand […] In Sweden, French wine sales dropped by 50 
percent. […] In the United States, a coalition of 40 disarmament, religious, and 
environmental groups sparked a consumer boycott, while the U.S. Senate 
unanimously adopted a resolution condemning French and Chinese nuclear 
testing (p. 210). 
 
Despite the overwhelming public support for a comprehensive test ban, the 
Conference was not able to complete negotiations on this subject. From January 1994 to 
September 1996, states parties to the CD worked intensively to draft the treaty and 
achieved significant progress on the language, the scope and the obligations established 
by the CTBT. However, political quarrels, coupled with the consensual decision-making 
process of the CD, prevented the final agreement from becoming a reality. In view of 
the impasse inside the CD, the Australian delegation decided to work to bring the CTBT 
directly to the UN for endorsement. The anti-nuclear organizations, which had been 
following closely the discussions in the CD, pressed the member states to support the 
Australian resolution in the UNGA. On 10 September 1996, shortly after China had 
announced it would join the test moratorium, a special session of the UNGA approved 
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the CTBT by a margin of 158 to 3, with 5 abstentions (UN General Assembly, 1996a). 
As a result, the treaty was opened for signature in New York on 24 September 1996.
25
  
The campaign to end nuclear tests involved efforts coming from different parts 
of world, which were mobilised not only by the anti-nuclear movement, but also by 
health and environmental organisations. Nuclear tests represented the broad threat of 
nuclear annihilation, but they also had visible health and environmental effects 
wherever they were conducted. Drawing attention to the links between uranium mining, 
nuclear weapons production, nuclear test explosions and nuclear waste dumping, it was 
possible to create an inclusive movement and a prominent campaign. This, however, 
was the last time a project carried out by the nuclear abolition movement received 
ample media attention. For the remaining of the 1990s, nuclear abolitionists continued 
with their activities; but these were largely ignored by the big media and the general 
public.  
Like the test ban campaign, the World Court Project originated in the 1980s and 
achieved its apex in the mid-1990s. Headed by the largest US peace group, the 
International Peace Bureau (successor of SANE/Freeze), and two prominent nuclear 
abolition INGOs - the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 
(IPPNW) and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms 
(IALANA) - this campaign was designed to have the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
rule on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Even though the World 
Court Project did not have the mass appeal the test ban had, it still made its way inside 
the UNGA. In 1994, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Indonesia 
proposed to the forty-ninth session of the UNGA a resolution entitled "Request for an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons". A heated debate followed the Indonesian draft and, despite the 
fierce lobbying campaign against it promoted by the nuclear powers, the resolution was 
adopted by a margin of 78 to 43, with 38 abstentions (UN General Assembly, 1994).  
Taking up the case, the ICJ issued its advisory opinion in July 1996. The reply 
consisted in six different findings, some of which were the outcome of a tight vote. By 
the President’s casting vote, the Court ruled that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed 
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conflict, and particularly the principles and rules of humanitarian law” (International 
Court of Justice, 1996). Moreover, the Court decided unanimously that “there exists an 
obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to 
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects” (Ibid.). Since then, the anti-nuclear movement 
has repeated constantly these statements, in an attempt to remind the states of their 
“legal obligation to disarm”. Starting from the fifty-first session of the UNGA, in 1996, 
a resolution on the follow-up of the ICJ’s ruling has been adopted annually. The 
securitising tone of the resolution was already set in the preambulatory clauses, which 
affirmed that “the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all 
humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth” 
(UN General Assembly, 1996b). Additionally, in this resolution, the UNGA recognised 
that “the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again” (Ibid.). Thus, in the 
operative clauses, the General Assembly issued a call to all states  
 
to commence multilateral negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear-
weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, 
deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and 
providing for their elimination (Ibid).  
 
The idea of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) was certainly not new. 
Different states and NGOs had already suggested the establishment of a legally binding 
international convention, regulating the elimination and institutionalising the prohibition 
of the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of 
nuclear weapons. Both biological and chemical weapons had been outlawed in a similar 
fashion, so it was only logical that the prohibition of nuclear weapons would follow this 
format.
26
 Despite this apparent consent on the format of the NWC, the idea had been 
met with the scepticism of those who asserted the unlikelihood of obtaining agreements 
on the legal and technical requirements of such treaty. Moreover, there had been no 
concrete proposals coming from states, nor had any serious research been conducted on 
this topic. Motivated by the outcome of the World Court Project, experts from different 
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 It is important to note that there are substantial differences between the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Although the two treaties require the 
elimination of existing stocks of warfare agents and prohibit their acquisition in the future, only the CWC 
effectively establishes a verification regime.  
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organisations came together and drafted themselves a model NWC. Equipped with this 
new tool, a network of nuclear abolition INGOs and NGOs started campaigning for 
international negotiations leading to the establishment of a NWC as the solution to the 
nuclear threat. 
Continuing to work with states willing to advance the goal of nuclear abolition, 
the anti-nuclear movement managed to include the model NWC in the “general and 
complete disarmament” agenda of the fifty-second session of the UNGA, in 1997. At 
the request of Costa Rica, the Model NWC was translated into the UN official 
languages and circulated to the UN member states. In his introductory letter, the 
Ambassador of Costa Rica presented the Model NWC as an initiative of the civil 
society, aimed at creating legal instruments to achieve the goal of total elimination of 
nuclear weapons. He also stated his belief that states should carry through with this 
enterprise (UN General Assembly, 1997a). This was an important moment for the 
nuclear abolition movement. As the draft reached national delegations, there was a real 
chance that it would be incorporated into their discussions.  However, with regard to the 
resolutions adopted by this session of the UNGA, no substantive progress on nuclear 
disarmament was achieved apart from the second resolution on the follow-up of the 
advisory opinion of the ICJ (UN General Assembly, 1997b). 
As a document for discussion, the Model NWC that circulated in the UNGA 
received comments, criticisms and suggestions for improvement. It was then reviewed 
by a consortium of experts and published in Security and Survival: The case for a 
Nuclear Weapons Convention (1999); a book by IPPNW, IALANA, and the 
International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP). In 
addition to the improved version of the Model NWC, Security and Survival also 
contained comments and critical questions regarding different aspects of the treaty. 
Intended to a broader audience than the political elite, this publication also contained 
advocacy statements, poetry, cartoons and pictures related to the subject of nuclear 
weapons. In addition to the printed version, the book was made available online.  
The campaign for a NWC continued to be one of the major projects of the anti-
nuclear movement throughout the 2000s. In the first NPT Review Conference after the 
extension, in 2000, the states parties finally agreed to allocate a meeting at each of the 
sessions of the Review Conference for NGOs to address the NPT delegates. In this 
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opportunity, fifteen different statements were delivered by members of several nuclear 
abolition organisations. When speaking to the national delegates, the NGOs’ members 
expressed their concern about the threat posed by nuclear weapons and the lack of 
progress towards disarmament. The contextual situation was particularly challenging; 
India and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests in 1998, putting into question the 
legitimacy of the NPT regime. In order to tackle the nuclear threat and put an end to 
proliferation, the members of anti-nuclear NGOs suggested that the NPT delegates 
worked harder to achieve a NWC. Costa Rica and Malaysia had submitted a working 
paper to the Conference, in which they drew attention to the 1996 ICJ’s advisory 
opinion and asked the states parties to discuss the legal, technical and political elements 
required for a NWC (NPT Review Conference, 2000a). At the end of the Conference, 
the NPT states were able to adopt a final agreement, where thirteen practical steps 
towards disarmament were listed (NPT Review Conference, 2000b). 
Despite these positive developments, the idea of nuclear disarmament suffered a 
serious setback in the year after the Conference, when terrorists attacked the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The “Global War on Terrorism” 
(GWoT) launched by President Bush in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks redefined 
the strategic landscape of American foreign policy, as well as its priorities. The linkage 
between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) became central to 
American foreign policy thinking. Certain that a terrorist attack involving nuclear, 
biological or chemical weapons would have disastrous effects, the Bush administration 
turned non-proliferation of WMD and the aversion of acts of terrorism into its highest 
priorities.  
In this context, President Bush gave notice of the American withdrawal from the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), in December 2001. The withdrawal, which was 
justified on national security grounds, also led to the abrogation of the START II; since 
the version of this treaty that had been approved by the Russian Duma was based on 
ABMT protocols. As there were no signs indicating that the Bush administration 
intended to revive the CTBT, which had been rejected by the Senate during the Clinton 
presidency, it became apparent that arms control mechanisms were not among the top 
objectives of American foreign policy. In fact, plans to design new nuclear weapons 
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were emerging in the US, infuriating anti-nuclear activists all over the world (Wittner, 
2007). 
Amid these setbacks, the hands of the Doomsday Clock, which had already been 
moved closer to midnight twice since 1991, were again rearranged. In February 2002, 
the Board of Directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists decided humanity was 
only seven minutes away from midnight. By stating this, the scientists intended to draw 
attention to the negative consequences of the abrogation of arms control and 
disarmament measures. The world was heading towards self-destruction and it was 
matter of the highest priority to prevent this prognosis from materialising. In this sense, 
the scientists argued that strengthening disarmament commitments was the only way to 
protect the world from the nuclear threat and to impede terrorists from acquiring WMD 
(Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2002). 
As the atomic scientists tried to securitise the existence of nuclear weapons, 
President Bush mobilised efforts to prevent WMD proliferation in specific countries; 
like Iran, Iraq and North Korea. The Bush administration linked terrorism to Iraq; 
arguing that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD capabilities and that he might, at some 
point in the near future, make this weapons available to terrorist groups. As the Iraqi 
government had been reluctant to give UN weapons inspectors complete information 
and access to the alleged WMD facilities, the Bush administration decided that military 
force was necessary to counter this threat. With the support of the UK and a few other 
nations, the US launched a major offensive attack, invading Iraq in March 2003. 
Putting in place significant arms control measures between states became 
increasingly difficult this context. Accordingly, discussing nuclear disarmament at the 
governmental level was almost impossible. Yet, Russia and the US managed to 
conclude and sign the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), in May 2002. 
While it limited the number of deployed warheads, the so-called “Moscow Treaty” did 
not require the destruction of retired delivery systems or the dismantlement of 
warheads. Moreover, the Treaty did not establish its own verification regime, relying on 
the verification mechanisms of START I, which was set to expire three years before the 
reductions under SORT were to be achieved. For these reasons, the Moscow Treaty was 
severely criticised by anti-nuclear activists, as well as arms controllers; who expected 
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the US and Russia to move towards more restrictive, verified nuclear arms control 
agreements.
27
  
If the prospect for nuclear abolition talks inside governments was dim, the same 
was true for civil society groups. As it became clear that Saddam Hussein did not posses 
any nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, the anti-war campaign gained urgency and 
the goal of nuclear disarmament was left to the background. Anti-war groups sprang all 
over the world and anti-nuclear organisations worked hard to link these two concerns 
together. To some extent, the challenges posed by this new configuration also 
represented good opportunities to the nuclear movement According to Kate Hudson, the 
chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament's (CND), by taking part in the anti-war 
movement, the CND was able to present arguments in favour of nuclear abolition to 
people who were initially mobilised by the question of war. As she put it, “working 
against war and working against nuclear weapons are both part of the same process 
toward global peace […] Minds are now open; it's up to us to speak with them” 
(Hudson, 2007). 
In fact, anti-war groups joined efforts with nuclear abolitionists in a rally in New 
York City, as thousands of people demonstrated on the day before the 2005 NPT 
Review Conference was due to start. NGOs and civil society groups had high 
expectations for this Conference, since the NPT regime had been shaken by recent 
developments; such as: the North Korean withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, the 
discovery of AQ Khan’s international nuclear smuggling network and the controversies 
surrounding the Iranian nuclear energy programme. They expected the Conference to 
address these problems and provide means for strengthening the regime.  
That, however, did not happen. As the 2004 NPT Preparatory Committee had 
failed to produce agreement on the work agenda and on the organisation of the main and 
subsidiary bodies, the 2005 Review Conference spent an unusually large amount of time 
deliberating on procedural matters. Many plenary statements, reports, and working 
papers that had been submitted to the Conference could not be discussed in the scarce 
time allocated for substantial work. One of the “debates that did not occur” (Nielsen and 
Simpson, 2005, p. 282) in the 2005 NPT Review Conference surely refers to the 
working paper submitted by Costa Rica and Malaysia, among others, calling for the 
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establishment of negotiations on a NWC (NPT Review Conference, 2005). The topic 
was approached by the members of civil society in the session devoted to the dialogue 
between NGOs and NPT delegates, but it did not lead to substantial discussions.
28
 At 
the end of the Conference, the NPT states failed to adopt a final document with concrete 
recommendations for preventing proliferation or moving toward nuclear disarmament. 
Not surprisingly, the 2005 Review Conference has ever since been referred to as a 
disaster. 
One of the reasons why the Conference failed to produce an agreement that 
could strengthen the regime was the emphasis placed by the US on non-proliferation 
and the disregard toward the goal of disarmament. Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
(NNWS) expected the link between these two objectives to be properly addressed, since 
the 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the NPT was made taking into account the 
NWS’s promise to carry out the elimination of their nuclear arsenal. After the failure of 
the 2005 NPT Conference, the Nobel Commission considered appropriate to draw 
attention to the importance of international cooperation in the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. Thus, the Commission awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its director, Mohamed ElBaradei, “for their efforts 
to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes” (Norwegian Nobel 
Committee, 2005). In his acceptance speech, ElBaradei referred to the arising of a 
dangerous configuration, in which the emergence of a nuclear black market, the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear technology and the stagnation in 
nuclear disarmament posed major threats to the world. He argued that it was imperative 
to avert these problems through the establishment of a nuclear abolition regime. In this 
sense, he stated: “I have no doubt that, if we hope to escape self-destruction, then 
nuclear weapons should have no place in our collective conscience, and no role in our 
security” (ElBaradei, 2005). 
Nuclear proliferation would make the news again in October 2006, when North 
Korea – formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) – 
conducted its first nuclear explosion. The DPRK’s government, which made no effort to 
hide or deny the test, justified it as a demonstration of power against international 
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sanctions and the American threats of nuclear war (Kerr, 2006). The test was severely 
condemned by the US, the UN, NATO and individual states. Although the six-party 
talks were resumed two months after the test, disruptions continued to mark the 
negotiations between the DPRK, South Korea, China, the US, Russia and Japan.  
In January 2007, the Doomsday Clock was moved even closer to midnight. The 
scientists’ decision to place the clock’s hands at 5 minutes to midnight took account of 
the first North Korean nuclear test, suspicions regarding the Iranian nuclear energy 
programme and the lack of serious efforts to tackle climate change.
29
 That same month, 
the Wall Street Journal had published an op-ed by former secretaries of state George 
Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Defence Secretary William Perry, and former 
Senator Sam Nunn. In "A world free of nuclear weapons”, the four American statesmen 
followed a similar reasoning, arguing that reliance on nuclear weapons for purposes of 
deterrence was becoming “increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective”. Thus, 
they recognised the need to move towards “reversing reliance on nuclear weapons 
globally” and “ultimately ending them as a threat to the world” (Schultz, et al., 2007). 
The importance of this public statement in favour of nuclear disarmament made by 
political figures associated with realpolitik was unprecedented. Distancing the goal of 
nuclear abolition from the utopianism with which it had been usually associated, 
Schultz, et al., strengthened the securitising claims of nuclear abolitionists and opened 
political space so that discussions about eliminating nuclear weapons could take place 
inside governments again.  
In the US, this endorsement of the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons set 
the political mood for the presidential campaign that was under way. In this context, the 
two main candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, spoke in favour of moving 
toward a nuclear-weapon-free world in different occasions. “Given this remarkable 
bipartisan consensus”, Daalder and Lodal (2008) predicted, “the next president will 
have an opportunity to make the elimination of all nuclear weapons the organizing 
principle of US nuclear policy” (p. 81).  
The WSJ op-ed also had repercussions at the international level, generating a 
wave of positive responses coming from different parts of the world (see Appendix 2). 
Nuclear disarmament was gaining momentum again and that was evident not only in the 
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formal support issued by major political figures, but in the increased level of activities 
led by anti-nuclear organisations. As Wittner (2009) observed, after years of decrease, 
membership in long-established nuclear abolition groups began to recover (p. 219). 
Once again, anti-nuclear demonstrations were gathering large crowds. For instance, in 
February 2007, nearly 100,000 people gathered in London to protest against the 
replacement of Trident nuclear submarines (Wittner, 2009, p. 219). In order to assure a 
good turnout to this demonstration, CND emphasised all negative aspects of 
maintaining a nuclear deterrence. In addition to highlighting the security threat posed by 
nuclear weapons, the campaigners also employed political and economic arguments 
against renewing the Trident system. As a result, the popular opposition to Trident’s 
replacement in Britain became apparent and the government was forced to bring the 
issue back to parliament before final action was taken (Wittner, 2009, p. 220). 
It was also in 2007 that different nuclear abolition INGOs joined efforts and 
launched the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). An 
umbrella organisation, ICAN included NGOs all around the world. Modelled in the 
successful International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), ICAN’s main objective 
was to promote the “security action”, the abolition of nuclear weapons through the 
establishment of a NWC. With the intention of providing ICAN with an up-to-date 
lobbying tool, the Model NWC and the texts that were part of Security and Survival 
were updated and reprinted. In this renewed momentum for the anti-nuclear movement, 
IPPNW, IALANA and INESAP came together again and published Securing our 
Survival (SOS): The case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In accordance with the 
title, securitising claims permeated all the different texts contained in this book. 
Again in 2007, Costa Rica submitted a working paper on the NWC to the 2007 
NPT Preparatory Committee (NPT Preparatory Committee, 2007). Additionally, the 
Costa Rican and the Malaysian governments requested that the updated model NWC be 
circulated in the sixty-second session of the UNGA (UN General Assembly, 2008). 
Regarding the resolutions adopted by this session of the General Assembly, not much 
progress was made, except for the annual resolution on the follow-up of the ICJ’s 
advisory opinion (UN General Assembly, 2007). Not surprisingly, the Bush 
administration voted against all resolutions that contained any disarmament language 
(Wittner, 2009, p. 218).  
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As the calls for nuclear disarmament grew stronger, the WSJ published another 
op-ed signed by Schultz, et al., in the beginning of 2008. Under the title “Toward a 
nuclear-free world”, the four American statesmen reinstated the opinion expressed in 
the previous year and affirmed the need to reduce reliance the “deadliest weapons ever 
invented”. According to them, the world was facing a “nuclear tipping point” and it was 
necessary to act fast to avoid the “nuclear precipice” and end nuclear weapons as a 
threat to the world (Schultz, et al., 2008). 
In that same year, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented his five-
point plan on nuclear disarmament. Addressing a meeting organised at the United 
Nations by the East-West Institute, Ki-moon mentioned the threats posed by nuclear 
weapons, which, he said, can have “horrific consequences”. With the purpose of 
overcoming the nuclear threat, the Secretary-General put together a plan. Already in the 
first point listed, he urged all NPT parties, in particular the NWS, to consider 
negotiating a NWC without delay (Ki-moon, 2008).  
Strengthening the calls for a nuclear-weapon-free world, the Global Zero 
movement was launched in December 2008. Congregating high-profile political figures 
and former politicians and officials of the Cold War era,
30
 Global Zero defended phased 
and verified reductions; as well as a binding agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons 
by a certain date (Global Zero Commission, 2009). The political and social capital of 
the members of this group proved to be a catalysing factor and, shortly after it had been 
founded, Global Zero representatives held meetings with military officials and political 
leaders from key countries, like the US and Russia (Corera, 2008).  
Soon after coming to power, Obama’s views on nuclear disarmament were met 
with strong criticism, as North Korean conducted a second nuclear test, on 25 May 
2009. Nevertheless, President Obama was to become a prominent voice in favour of the 
goal of nuclear disarmament, especially after the so-called “Prague Speech”. In the 
capital of the Czech Republic, in April 2009, Obama reinstated his belief on the 
feasibility of a world free of nuclear weapons. According to him, tackling this threat 
meant securing our society, our economy and our ultimate survival (The White House, 
                                                 
30
 Signatories included former US President Jimmy Carter, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, 
former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and former British Defence Secretary Malcolm 
Rifkind. For the complete list of signatories, see http://www.globalzero.org/full-list-signatories [Accessed 
on 21 July 2011].  
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2009). At the same time that Obama announced his “dream of zero”, he was clear about 
the obstacles standing on the way to disarmament. Obama mentioned the DPRK’s 
defiance and argued for a strong international response to it, stating that “the world must 
stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons” (The White House, 2009). 
 Under the leadership of President Obama, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) approved the Resolution 1887; which reiterated the NWS’ obligation under 
Article VI of the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament (UN Security Council, 2009). 
Taking Obama’s efforts into consideration, the Nobel Committee awarded him the 
Peace Prize, as a recognition of his work “to strengthen international diplomacy and 
cooperation between peoples” (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2009). Symptomatically, 
the Committee highlighted Obama's leadership in the building of a world free from 
nuclear weapons (Ibid.). 
Due to the emerging favourable scenario for nuclear disarmament, the 
Doomsday Clock was reset again, in 2010. This time, the clock’s hands were moved 
one minute away from midnight, giving humanity six minutes until its self destruction. 
By moving back the clock, the atomic scientists praised the international efforts aimed 
at strengthening nuclear cooperation, as well as the improved relations between the US 
and Russia and Obama’s dream of nuclear zero. These positive developments, however, 
did not diminish the urgency of their securitising claims. As it was stated on the Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists (2010),  
 
For the first time in decades we have an opportunity to free ourselves from the 
terror of nuclear weapons and to slow drastic changes to our shared global 
environment. We encourage scientists to continue their engagement with these 
issues and make their analysis widely known. We urge leaders to fulfil the 
promise of a nuclear weapon-free world and to act now to slow the pace of 
climate change. Finally, we call on citizens everywhere to raise their voices and 
compel public action for a safer world now and for future generations. The 
Clock is ticking. 
 
Sensing a window of opportunity, nuclear abolition activists intensified their 
lobbying practices before and during the 2010 NPT Review Conference. A day prior to 
the Conference, fifteen thousands of people gathered in an anti-nuclear rally in New 
York, on May 2 2010. At the Conference, twenty-eight countries specifically referred to 
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a NWC. Additionally, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) – representing 118 countries 
– voiced demands for a time-bound commitment to achieve nuclear abolition under a 
NWC (Wright, 2010, pp. 52; 53). This time, the Conference agreed on a final 
agreement; in which efforts aimed at commencing negotiations on a NWC were finally 
acknowledged (NPT Review Conference, 2010b). 
 
3.3 Securitising moves in different settings 
The analysis of the main developments involving the securitisation of nuclear 
weapons in the post-Cold War period supports the view of securitisation as a complex, 
historical process. As such, securitisations involve a plurality of practices, actors and 
audiences. Even though state actors have recently incorporated securitising claims to 
their rhetoric, this dissertation seeks to investigate the securitisation of nuclear weapons 
from the perspective of its long-standing advocates, the anti-nuclear movement. 
Through this approach, this research intends to advance the study of non-state actors’ 
engagement in international military affairs and to shed light on the possible 
instrumentality of securitisation as a way of raising an issue on the agenda of decision-
makers and urging them to take action. 
The array of different practices involved in the securitisation promoted by the 
anti-nuclear organisations points to the existence of various “battle fronts” where the 
construction of nuclear weapons as a threat is fought; that is, it is negotiated between 
the securitiser and the audiences. In order to gain better understanding of the variations 
in the form, content, and success of different securitising moves, Salter (2008) borrowed 
the concept of “setting” from Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis (p. 322). According to 
Salter (2008), “the setting of a securitizing act includes the stage on which it is made, 
the genre in which it is made, the audience to which it is pitched, and the reception of 
the audience” (p. 328). This dramaturgical approach comes to remedy the exaggerated 
emphasis on the internal elements of discourse that is part of the speech-act model 
proposed by the Copenhagen School. As Salter has observed, the success of a 
securitisation cannot be reduced to the formal syntax of the speech; it is also related to 
the existence of a common, social grammar, which encompasses the “particular history, 
dominant narrative, constitutive characters, and the structure of the setting itself” (2008, 
p. 331).  
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The different settings in which the securitising actors usually stage their 
performance are the following: the popular, the elite, the technocratic and the scientific 
(Salter, 2008). Affecting the way in which the securitiser chooses to present its claims 
are the different audiences comprised in these settings, as well as the specific rules and 
procedures that governs them. Employing Salter’s classification of settings, it is 
possible to identify the main moves and their respective audiences in the securitisation 
of nuclear weapons conducted by the nuclear abolition movement (see Table 1). It is 
important to remember that, in reality, these different settings are all connected, “as they 
are part of the same policy-making process” (Léonard and Kaunert, 2011, p. 74).  
Salter’s scheme permits a more nuanced and complete analysis of the 
securitising moves, which can succeed in a given setting and yet fail to gain the support 
of a different audience. Thus, he argues that securitisation studies should be able to 
account for the varying degrees of success achieved by the securitiser.  
 
 Table 1 – Four settings in which the anti-nuclear movement stages its securitising moves 
SETTING 
MAIN 
AUDIENCE 
MAIN 
STAGES 
MAIN  
SECURITISING MOVES 
Elite Top-rank 
politicians 
the UNGA and 
the institutional 
bodies of the 
NPT review 
process 
Discussions in the Senate/ 
Parliament; debates in the 
UNGA and in the NPT Review 
Conferences; international 
workshops; high-level political 
meetings. 
Popular General public 
 
 
Mainstream 
media, the 
Internet. 
Movies; documentaries; music; 
newspaper articles; popular 
demonstrations; paper handouts. 
Scientific Academics, 
scientists and 
arms controllers.  
Expert 
conferences 
Academic publications; expert 
conferences. 
Technocratic Civil Servants Conference on 
Disarmament 
and the UN 
Disarmament 
Commission. 
Debates and negotiations in the 
Conference on Disarmament and 
the UN Disarmament 
Commission. 
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The technocratic setting  
If it is true that “the restrictions of mandate and bureaucratic thinking will 
predominate in technocratic politics” (Salter, 2008, p. 331), then there is no doubt that 
the CD and the United Nations Disarmament Commissions (UNDC) are, in this case, 
the main stages of the technocratic setting. These two multilateral fora are characterised 
by intensive debates about their own procedural rules and lack of progress regarding 
substantial disarmament issues. Moreover, both institutions have quite restrictive 
policies governing the participation of civil society organisations.  
In the CD, for instance, very little of what happens during the many weeks in 
which the Conference is convened is open to NGOs. Notwithstanding, nuclear abolition 
organisations have found ways to lobby national delegations and engage with the work 
of the Conference. They can request the official documents of the plenary meetings and 
follow the online reports of NGOs that are present in Geneva and, thus, are aware of the 
discussions inside the CD. NGOs also have the right to submit documents to the CD and 
to make written material available to the members of the Conference two times per year. 
In 2004, the CD agreed on hosting one informal meeting with NGOs every annual 
session. However, this can only occur once the CD has adopted a programme of work, 
which does not happen very often.
31
 Some member-states have emphasised the need to 
modify the rules of the CD so that NGOs can be more effectively included in the 
process, but no substantial improvements have so far been achieved.
32
 
 Even though there is little public interest in the UNDC, anti-nuclear NGOs try to 
follow these meetings. During the spring, when the Disarmament Commission meets, 
the organisations that can make their way to New York hold panel discussions in 
connection with the UNDC agenda. In order to engage with the member states, NGOs 
try to organise these events in partnership with national delegations. These informal 
meetings are one of the stages nuclear abolitionists created to present their securitising 
moves in the technocratic setting.  
                                                 
31
 After ten years of impasse, the CD was able to adopt a programme of work in 2009. However, the 
Conference failed to adopt a framework for implementation before the annual session ended. When it 
resumed its work in 2010, the programme of work had to be renegotiated among members, who failed to 
come to a consensus. The Conference ended its 2010 session without any progress on substantive issues.  
32
 For the past two years, the Conference has allowed members of the Women’s International League for 
Peace and Freedom (WILPF) to read out a statement on the occasions of the International Women’s Day. 
This has been the only chance members of NGOs have had to address the delegates during an official 
session.  
 49 
The scientific setting 
The scientific setting is mostly made up by nuclear scientists and arms 
controllers. Considering that these experts posses authoritative knowledge on subjects 
that are relevant to policy projects, it is tempting to see them as an “epistemic 
community” (Haas, 1992). This representation, however, may be misleading. As 
Johnson (2009) has already noted, there are difficulties in presenting these actors as a 
unified community (p. 198). The political fragmentation of these scientists and arms 
controllers and the fact that they actually provide competing information and advice 
makes it more prudent to characterise them in terms of epistemic groups rather than a 
single community.  
Although this is somewhat a restricted environment, organisations that focus on 
research and are part of the network of nuclear experts have managed to promote a 
discourse in favour of nuclear abolition in the stages of the scientific setting.
33
 This is 
not that difficult, considering that a large number of scientists are openly concerned 
with the military use of nuclear technology and supportive of the goal of nuclear 
disarmament. While there is a long tradition of calls for nuclear zero coming from the 
scientific rank, one should not overlook the arguments of scientists and arms controllers 
that advocate for “nuclear security” - which usually involves increased budget, being 
allocated to further development of nuclear military technology as to increase the safety, 
security, and reliability of nuclear arsenals.  
As it is evident, science and politics are very much intertwined in the 
securitising moves conducted in this setting. For instance, amid the CTBT negotiations, 
in the 1990s, the feasibility of a global system monitoring nuclear tests was a prominent 
topic of scientific research. Different conferences were organised with the purpose of 
debating monitoring techniques; which required scientific input from the disciplines of 
seismology, hydroacoustics, infrasound and radiounuclide. Since these scientific 
exchanges were part of the political battle surrounding the CTBT completion and 
posterior entry into force, they were also part of the different securitising moves in 
favour of disarmament or deterrence. As the CTBT remains in limbo, the CTBTO – the 
                                                 
33
 The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the Verification Research, Training and Information 
Centre (VERTIC), SIPRI, INESAP and IPPW are all examples of organisations that, in varying degrees, 
promote securitising moves in the scientific setting. 
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organisation in charge of the Treaty – continues to promote these scientific meetings, at 
the same time that it tries to spark the necessary ratifications to bring it into effect.
34
  
Although this setting is not completely accessible to the general public, 
securitisers have explored the scientists’ expert knowledge in securitising moves aimed 
at the popular or elite audiences. Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United 
Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the 
inspections it conducted figured constantly in the political discussions of the US and the 
UK (Roe, 2008). At present, IAEA inspectors, weapons specialists, scientists and 
engineers have taken part in the controversy related to the Iranian nuclear programme. 
Talks about nuclear fuels, the levels of uranium enrichment and the different types of 
nuclear reactors frequently present a mix of scientific, political and security issues.  
 
The popular setting 
Securitising moves in the popular setting declined greatly after the end of Cold 
War. The turnout in public events aimed at strengthening the calls for nuclear abolition 
is definitely smaller now than it used to be during the apexes of the movement, in the 
late 1950s and in the 1980s. Even so, anti-nuclear activists have continuously used 
opinion polls results to make their case for abolition, arguing that the general public is 
in favour of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
35
 The sources of those opinion 
polls vary and so does the reliability of such data. Nevertheless, it has been showed that, 
accurate or not, statistical data can have a real impact on securitisation processes - 
especially when picked up by the media (Léonard and Kaunert, 2011, p. 69; 70). This, 
however, has not been the case of the anti-nuclear movement; which remained largely 
ignored by the mainstream media throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. 
Counterproliferation, instead of disarmament, has been the perspective favoured by the 
media to address matters of nuclear security. Accordingly, the controversial nuclear 
programmes of Iran and North Korea have been extensively covered, but the linkages 
between nuclear proliferation and the lack of progress towards disarmament have been 
left unexplored (Tyson, 2004, p. 61). 
                                                 
34
 In recent years, the CTBTO has hosted the Symposium on Synergies with Science (2006), the 
International Scientific Studies Conference (2009) and the Science and Technology Conference (2011). 
The objective of these meetings was to discuss and explore advances in science and technology relevant 
to test ban verification and the Treaty’s entry into force.  
35
 A compilation of these polls can be found at http://www.icanw.org/polls  
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Other means of communication have contributed to securitisation processes, 
such as the documentary films An Inconvenient Truth (2006) and Countdown to Zero 
(2010). From the same producers, the two movies conveyed the sense of urgency 
associated with the threats of global warming and nuclear weapons, respectively.  In 
what it can be seen as a major securitising move in the popular setting, Countdown to 
Zero featured interviews with leading statesmen and experts, who recounted real life 
situations in which nuclear weapons have almost been used; as well as times when 
major nuclear accidents could have happened, but were just averted. The Global Zero 
movement, which promoted the movie to large audiences, described Countdown to Zero 
as “a chilling wake up call about the urgency of the nuclear threat” (Global Zero, 2010). 
Countdown to Zero opened in movie theatres in different countries, but is 
currently available online for download. In the internet, one might also find other films, 
videos, songs and texts that portray the existence of nuclear weapons as an existential 
threat to human survival. As Vaughn (2009) has observed, securitising moves on the 
internet can be quite relevant; especially, if they are primarily available through news 
sources or other media outlets (p. 274).  Famous musicians, actors, leaders and political 
figures who support nuclear disarmament also strengthen securitising moves in this 
setting.  
 
The elite setting 
Although securitising actors may require the support of several audiences, the 
elite setting comprises the central audience to this particular securitisation. Since it is 
constituted by political leaders who are influential at the global, regional and national 
levels, this setting effectively congregates the audience “whose attitude has a direct 
causal connection with the desired goals” (Balzacq, 2005, p. 185); that is, the states’ 
representatives who have the formal power to start negotiations on a NWC. Even 
though this setting comprises a variety of stages, the most important ones are the UNGA 
and the NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees. 
The UNGA has played a significant role in world affairs involving arms control 
and disarmament norms. Several declarations and resolutions have been first adopted in 
the United Nations before producing conventions and treaties (Lewis and Thakur, 2004, 
p. 19). Although not all arms control agreements have been crafted inside UN forums, 
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all the different treaties banning biological and chemical weapons, as well as landmines 
and cluster munitions, have been developed with the support of a significant number of 
governments, international organisations and UN agencies. In this particular case, it is 
expected that a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons will need the support of the 
UNGA and the UNSC (Andreasen, 2009). 
The empowering audience, the one that has the ability to enable the securitising 
actor to adopt the measures that would tackle the threat, can also be found in the NPT 
regime and its institutional bodies. As the NPT review process has been gradually 
opened to NGO participation, the idea of a NWC started to receive more attention from 
the states parties. So far, the apex of this trend occurred in the latest NPT Review 
Conference, in 2010; when numerous states mentioned the NWC in their statements and 
efforts aimed at commencing negotiations on the NWC were for the first time 
acknowledged in the final document (NPT Review Conference, 2010). 
In the elite setting, it is quite difficult for nuclear abolition organisations to reach 
the audience. The asymmetry of power between states and non-state actors inside IGOs 
and other multilateral fora is expressive. Members of civil society organisations can 
only attend sessions designated as open and, even then, they might not have the right to 
participate in the discussions. Under special circumstances, NGOs may be allowed to 
address plenary sessions - but that has not happened frequently in the most important 
meetings. Taking these into account, it is clear that the elite setting is the most 
challenging one in this securitisation. In order to understand the obstacles preventing the 
macrosecuritisation of nuclear weapons from becoming a successful endeavour, it is 
imperative to analyse in detail the practices of the securitisers in this setting. 
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4. Empirical analysis of the elite setting: non-state actors and the 
campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in the UN General 
Assembly and the NPT review process (1997-2010) 
 
Considering the developments in the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold 
War period, the analysis that will be here presented examines the campaign for a NWC 
through the prism of securitisation theory. The securitiser actors in this case are the 
nuclear abolition organisations that have more prominently conducted securitising 
moves in the elite setting, mainly: IPPNW, IALANA, INESAP and ICAN. The time 
frame analysed encompasses the period from 1997, when the draft NWC was circulated 
in the UNGA for the first time, to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In between these 
two events, the securitisers delivered presentations at the NPT Review Conferences of 
2000 and 2005; as well as the NPT Preparatory Committees of 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 
2008 and 2009. The data sets available for each of these occasions varied. In addition to 
the written statements that were always accessible, it was possible to analyse video 
footage of the NGOs’ presentations at the 2005 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. 
Audio records of the presentations delivered during the 2007 Preparatory Committee 
were also examined. The two versions of the NWC that became UN official documents 
of the fifty-second and the sixty-second sessions, together with the introductory letters 
signed by representatives of Costa Rica and Malaysia, are included in the empirical 
analysis. The same is true for the working papers on the NWC submitted to the NPT 
Review Conferences of 2000, 2005 and 2010; as well as the 2007 NPT Preparatory 
Committee (See Table 2 for an overview of the dataset analysed. The complete list of 
the reviewed documents can be found in Appendix 1). 
 
Table 2 – Overview of the data analysed 
OCCASION DATASET 
Fifty-second session of the 
UNGA (1997) 
Official documents and resolutions 
2000 NPT Review Conference 
Working paper on the NWC; NGO presentations 
(written statements) 
2002 NPT Preparatory 
Committee 
NGO presentations (written statements) 
2003 NPT Preparatory 
Committee 
NGO presentations (written statements) 
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Table 2 (cont.) – Overview of the data analysed  
OCCASION DATASET 
2004 NPT Preparatory 
Committee 
NGO presentations (written statements) 
2005 NPT Review 
Conference 
Working paper on the NWC; NGO presentations (video 
footage and written statements) 
2007 NPT Preparatory 
Committee 
Working paper on the NWC; NGO presentations (audio 
records and written statements) 
Sixty-second session of the 
UNGA (2007) 
Official documents and resolutions 
2008 NPT Preparatory 
Committee 
NGO presentations (written statements) 
2009 NPT Preparatory 
Committee 
NGO presentations (written statements) 
2010 NPT Review 
Conference 
Working paper on the NWC; NGO presentations (video 
footage and written statements) 
 
4.1 Methodology  
With the purpose of understanding the process through which this specific public 
issue – the existence of nuclear weapons – becomes a security concern at the global 
level, discourse analysis will be used to uncover the structures and practices that are 
involved in the construction of a threat. Employing discourse analysis, other 
securitisation studies have been able to map the “emergence and evolution of patterns of 
representation which are constitutive of a threat image” (Balzacq, 2011, p. 39). 
Following this practice, it is expected that discourse analysis of the most central texts 
produced by the securitising actors will shed light on the sources, mechanisms and 
effects of the construction of nuclear weapons as a threat to the survival of all 
humankind. Although the term “text” strongly suggests written language, it will be used 
here to refer to a more diverse set of forms. A materialisation of discourse, texts can 
include a variety of signs (written and spoken utterances, symbols, pictures, music) - all 
capable of conveying meaning in a certain context (Balzacq, 2011b, p. 39). 
 Traditionally, discourse analysis has been mainly concerned with the content of 
the discourses, rather than the larger process in which such discourses are immersed. A 
range of scholars who considered such focus to be misleading started to promote a 
different conception of discourse analysis, which became known as Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1992; Wodak and Meyer, 2001). Considering that 
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discourse is a part of the social life and, thus, is inherently intersubjective, scholars 
associated with the CDA perspective have argued that discourse should be studied in its 
interaction with other discourses. Moreover, they asserted the need to take into account 
the larger contextual frame in which discourse is produced, delivered and consumed 
(Hardy and Phillips, 2004).  
From the perspective of the CDA, discourses are considered social practices, as 
well as representations of social practices. Discourses are resources that are activated by 
people in the construction of meaning about the world as much as they are practices that 
structure the meaning in use (Balzacq, 2011b, p. 39). As Fairclough (2003) has 
demonstrated, any process of “meaning-making” is invariably intersubjective and 
context dependent. Likewise, constructing a given issue as a security concern 
presupposes interaction between the securitising actor and the relevant audience(s), 
which are all situated in a specific time and place.  
In order to fully understand the discourse promoted by the securitiser, it is 
necessary to develop a framework for analysis in which the interlocutors of the speakers 
are properly represented and the immediate and distal contexts are also taken into 
account. Therefore, with the purpose of guiding the discourse analysis of the selected 
case studies, a customised framework for analysis was developed. Following Balzacq’s 
(2011b) suggestion, it comprises three different levels: agents, acts and context (p. 35). 
The first level encompasses the actors and relations that structure the securitisation, 
while the second one accounts for the discursive and non-discursive practices that 
underwrite the securitisation process. The third level provides for the way contextual 
factors can empower or disempower the securitising actors (Balzacq, 2011, p. 35; 36). 
This methodological construction is intended to facilitate the study of the securitisation 
process as a whole.  
If the levels of analysis follow Balzacq’s proposal, the same is not true for the 
constituent analytics within each level. The framework here developed deviates 
reasonably from his proposed scheme, as items particularly relevant to the study of the 
anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation have been introduced. The overall result is a 
comprehensive and yet practical framework for analysis (see Table 3). 
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Table 3 – Framework for discourse analysis  
 
 
LEVEL 1 - AGENTS 
 
1. Securitising actors (identity; social capital; authority) 
 
2. Audience(s) 
 
3. Referent object  
 
4. Other relevant actors 
 
LEVEL 2 - ACTS 
 
Specific grammar of security: 
5. Existential threat 
6. Urgency/ Point of no return 
7. Possible way out 
 
8. Meaning of security
36
 
 
9. Associative arguments
37
 
 
10. Intertextuality 
 
11. Heuristic artefacts 
 
12. Links with other securitisations 
 
LEVEL 3 - CONTEXTS 
 
13. Immediate setting  
 
14. Distal context 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36
 From a hermeneutical perspective, Ciută (2009) argued that the meaning the securitising actors attribute 
to the concept of security should also be part of the study of securitisation.  
37
 Vaughn (2009) has shed light on the important role associative arguments can play in the construction 
of security threats. If the securitiser successfully associates different security concerns, the audience(s) 
will be able to identify larger implications of the alleged threat. 
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4.2 Findings 
The findings of the empirical analysis reveal a consistent discourse, with no 
substantial variations throughout the years. The securitisers behave professionally, 
following the protocols of the stages and adjusting their language and the content of 
their discourse to the audience’s frame of reference. They draw their social capital upon 
the notions of representativeness, technical expertise and moral authority. Frequently, 
they portray themselves as representatives of the people, in opposition to the audience - 
who they see as representatives of states. In this sense, the members of the nuclear 
abolition organisations emphasise the power of the audience, who they affirm can put in 
place the relevant security action, the NWC. 
In the elite setting, the securitisers follow the specific grammar of security, 
arguing that the existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to the survival of 
humankind. They depict an alarming situation, in which the NPT is in crisis and the 
world is on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe. Accordingly, they argue that the time to 
act is now; otherwise, another use of nuclear weapons will most likely follow. Finally, 
the securitisers present the abolition of nuclear weapons under a NWC as the only 
alternative to a horrifying future.  
In addition to security utterances, the securitisers employ economic, legal, and 
political arguments that support the establishment of the security measure.  Although 
they refer to nuclear weapons as immoral, the nuclear abolitionists do not elaborate on 
this subject. They try to send an objective and rational message, avoiding emotional 
appeals to the audience. Even though they make use of different heuristic artefacts, the 
underuse of powerful images – an effective vehicle to express emotions – is noteworthy.  
From the perspective of human security, the securitisers link the nuclear threat 
with other security concerns. They see human security as an all-encompassing concept 
and defend that approaching nuclear disarmament and other international affairs from 
this point of view would enable states to address the broad implications and the 
interconnections of security problems. The anti-nuclear activists also try to delegitimise 
nuclear deterrence and dissociate it from the notion of security. Conversely, they always 
identify disarmament with security.   
The constraints imposed by the rules governing this setting have, in fact, 
encouraged the anti-nuclear organisations to work together. In face of the limited time 
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they have to address the audience, the activists focus on the common positions within 
the movement and avoid exposing internal disagreements. Another consequence of the 
procedural limitations is the scarce interaction between the securitiser and the audience.  
Finally, it was possible to see the impact of the larger contextual configuration 
on the securitising discourse. After the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the 
securitisers have raised the alarmist tone of their discourse. Moreover, the nuclear 
explosions conducted by the DPRK, the suspicious around the Iranian programme and 
reports of an emerging nuclear black market were all contextual factors that served to 
strengthen the urgency of their calls. Remarkably, the securitisers have since 2007 been 
depicting a favourable political configuration to the commencement of negotiations on a 
NWC. They continue to emphasise the negative developments surrounding the NPT 
regime, but they also highlight the growing political support for nuclear disarmament. 
In the securitising discourse, not only does the world need to move towards nuclear 
abolition now but the current political configuration is also favourable to it. This 
fortunate temporal coincidence has served to enhance even more the urgency of 
adopting the security measure; since the securitisers argue that action must be taken 
now, before this momentum is over.  
 
4.2.1 Agents 
This level of analysis encompasses actors and their relations, including: 
securitising actors, audiences, referent object and other actors.  
 
Securitising actors 
Traditionally, non-state actors have seldom been endowed with security tasks 
(Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 37). Even though NGOs have increased their participation in 
international politics and are now accepted as legitimate players in different negotiation 
processes, states remain the privileged actor in the military sector. Weapons and 
military security are usually framed in terms of state sovereignty, which places states at 
the centre of international agreements involving arms control or disarmament. 
Moreover, the procedural restrictions to civil society participation in the elite setting 
also configure obstacles to NGO involvement in the negotiation process. Nevertheless, 
non-state actors have been able to take part in and influence international opinion-
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building, agenda-setting and drafting. Successful attempts to promote change led by 
civil society organisations include the establishment of the 1986 UN Convention against 
Torture (Leary, 1979; Baehr, 1989), the 1989 UN Convention of the Rights of the Child 
(Price-Cohen, 1990; Cantwell, 1992), the 1997 Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention 
(Price, 1998; Anderson, 2000) and the 2008 Cluster Munition Convention. Among these 
four cases, the last two are of special significance to the study of the anti-nuclear 
macrosecuritisation, since they constitute concrete examples of civil society engagement 
in the establishment of conventions outlawing weapons. On those occasions, NGOs 
played a crucial role in getting the states to address these two types of weapons in a 
particular manner; affecting the way the states perceived the use of these weapons and, 
subsequently, changing states’ policies towards them.  
In order to achieve the mentioned treaties, civil society organisations worked 
together with states that were championing the same causes. As it has been stated 
before, the nuclear abolition movement also follows this practice. Often in the elite 
setting, anti-nuclear organisations have their proposals put forward by states that share 
their views on the need for a NWC.  In two different sessions of the UNGA, for 
instance, national delegates submitted the model NWC drafted by the NGOs as an 
official UN document. It was also national delegations that submitted working papers 
on the NWC for the NPT Review Conferences of 2000, 2005 and 2010; as well as the 
2007 NPT Preparatory Committee. Recognising that the draft was a civil society’s 
initiative, these diplomats endorsed the securitisers’ claims and reaffirmed that the 
NWC was a way to avert the nuclear threat (UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008).  
 The versions of the NWC that circulated in these meetings were not exactly the 
same, since the draft was constantly being developed. The changes and improvements 
in the NWC mostly referred to legal and technical questions, which are not particularly 
relevant for the study of this securitisation process.
38
 An analysis of the Preamble of the 
Convention, on the other hand, can be quite telling. It starts with the unusual opening 
“we the people of the Earth, through the States Parties to this Convention” (Ibid.). Even 
though the second part of the sentence is the standard formulation of international 
treaties, the initial one “we the people of the Earth” is atypical in the legal genre of 
texts. By emphasising the people as the subject of the agreement, the securitisers 
                                                 
38
 The legal and technical aspects of the NWC refer to the general obligations, phases for elimination, 
verification, national implementation measures, compliance, dispute settlement, financing, etc.  
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attempt to put the general public at the centre of international law. As it will be argued 
later, this choice is consistent with the concept of human security advocated by these 
activists.  
“We the people” is also a common expression the securitisers use to refer to 
themselves when delivering their presentations to the NPT delegates. The members of 
the NGOs call themselves the representatives of larger collectivities, repeatedly 
affirming that “we represent millions of people worldwide” (Hall, 2005). In their 
discourse, the members of these organisations avoid speaking on behalf of the specific 
NGO they belong to. They do, however, speak on behalf of the “NGO community” and 
the “global civil society”; as if trying to add legitimacy to their claims (See Hill, 2007; 
Loretz, 2007). At no point the speakers account for the fact that most of them come 
from Western countries and, thus, represent only a fraction of the world. By depicting 
themselves as representatives of the people, the securitisers provide a homogeneous and 
somewhat simplistic portray of the “millions of people worldwide”, overlooking the 
discrepant regional representation and the conflicting views that might exist within 
“global civil society”.  
With regard to the way the securitising actor presents itself, a rule has been 
unveiled: in the elite setting, the securitisers never speak as individuals. They always 
present themselves as a part of a collectivity; even if a relatively small one, like the 
group of “committed nuclear abolitionists” (Cabasso, 2009). As messengers of a larger 
movement, these securitisers avoid sounding personal. Nevertheless, it is evident that 
the personality or the reputation of the individual who transmits the statement can have 
an impact on the way the discourse is delivered and consumed. There are well-know 
activists within the nuclear abolitionist movement, some of which have developed good 
relations with national delegates and are respected by them, like Alice Slater and 
Rebecca Johnson. Other speakers are known for their achievements in different areas 
and are willing to lend their prestige to the nuclear disarmament cause; for instance, the 
Nobel Peace Prize co-laureate Jody Williams.  
Sometimes, the speakers contrast the identity of the civil society to that of the 
audience; saying: “while governments remain the ultimate decision-makers, it is NGOs 
that allow citizens across the globe to partake in the political process and make their 
voices heard” (Hall, 2005). Emphasising these two discrete arenas, the securitisers 
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portray themselves as independent, stating that “as NGOs we are not required to be 
diplomatic” (Datan, 2002). Reinstating the differences between the civil society and the 
governmental officials is also a way to draw attention to the importance of the work of 
NGOs, which aims at bridging the gap between these two spheres and broaden the 
participation of regular citizens in the decision-making processes.  
More recently, in the context of latest abolitionist wave, members of the NGOs 
have welcomed these new calls for disarmament coming from the political 
establishment (See Acheson, 2007; Burroughs, 2008). At the same time, they have 
expressed some discomfort related to being associated with “former Cold Warriors”. In 
fact, one speaker argued that they – representatives of the civil society – have a more 
privileged view of the steps involved in achieving nuclear disarmament than the 
political leaders of the Cold War and, thus, can offer better recommendations (Johnson, 
2010). In order to preserve the moral authority which has often been associated with 
nuclear abolition organisations, the NGOs try to keep a distance from members of the 
political establishment. 
In the capacity of the securitising actor, the members of the NGOs draw 
attention to their vast knowledge and different ranges of expertise. As one speaker told 
the audience: “as NGOs, we are here not only as a voice of civil society reminding you 
to get on with the job, but also a source of technical, scientific and medical knowledge 
at your disposal” (Hall, 2005). They evoke past experiences in which the efforts of the 
civil society were valuable to international decision-making, like the Landmine Ban and 
the Cluster Munition Convention, and state that their expertise and experience are 
available for further joint ventures (UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008; Williams 
2010).  
From the data analysed, it was possible to identify a network of identities and 
representations that the members of the nuclear abolition NGOs invoke as securitising 
actors; structured around the notions of representativeness, moral authority and 
technical expertise. Amidst the reviewed presentations, there is only one that deviates 
from this pattern: the speech made by Jody Williams, at the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference. When addressing the national delegates, Williams adopted a very personal 
and, thus, atypical stance. She apologised to the NGO community for abandoning the 
protocol and not sticking to the previously agreed statement, as she decided to 
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improvise. Trying to overcome the gap between the securitiser and the audience, she 
said: “I know that we are diplomats, we are civil society, but I am just speaking to us as 
human beings” (Williams, 2010). All her speech was centred on the humanitarian, 
rather than the legal or political, implications of the existence of nuclear weapons. 
While Williams is now a patron of ICAN, she was the coordinator of the ICBL. Since 
the campaign to ban landmines adopted a humanitarian rationale and focused on the 
dramatic negative effects of landmines, this might explain why she decided present 
herself as a human being. The content of her speech, structured from the humanitarian 
perspective, will be analysed below, under the section Acts.  
 
Audience(s) 
In this macrosecuritisation, the elite audience is mainly comprised by diplomats 
and rarely includes heads of states. As Browne, et al. (2010) has observed, it is rather 
unfortunate that most of the substantive issues regarding international nuclear policy-
making are to be agreed by technocrats and diplomats (p. 383). While these states’ 
representatives score high in entrepreneurial leadership, evident in their excellent 
negotiating skills, they lack substantive structural power (Browne, et al., 2010, p. 384). 
In this sense, it is reasonable to assume that a deeper engagement of top national leaders 
would inject a large dose of political leadership into the process and, thus, make it more 
effective. 
Yet, in the absence of heads of states, the diplomatic representatives are seen by 
the securitisers as a communication channel with the national leaderships. During the 
NGO sessions that are part of the NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory 
Committees, the securitisers direct their messages to the diplomatic delegates of the 
states parties and to the governments they represent. At times, this is done in a way that 
acknowledges the power of the audience; both encouraging and putting pressure on the 
national delegates. For instance, when one speaker addressed the audience, he said: “we 
need more statesmen with a political will to take us to total nuclear disarmament. Ladies 
and Gentlemen, this is the time and here is your chance” (Ramdas, 2000). There are 
several other examples of similar utterances, in which the securitising actors urge the 
audience to take responsibility for the outcome of the deliberations - since they are 
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instrumental in the establishment of the security measure proposed by the securitisers. 
Some of these statements are reproduced below:  
 
Here as you all sit to deliberate, shape and determine the destinies of millions of 
human beings, do please remember that many of them rely entirely on your 
foresight and wisdom for their survival (Ramdas, 2000).  
 
Remember that you diplomats are not simply the mouth pieces of your 
governments. You are the experts and the main actors in these negotiations. You 
make a difference in this room and in your capitals, which depend on you to tell 
them what is happening here and how to advance your state's interests. We have 
seen the difference even a small number of active, engaged and visionary 
diplomats make in this process. We have also seen the difference a small 
number of active, engaged, and destructive diplomats make in this process. In 
this review cycle, the world needs leaders. It needs diplomats and governments 
that are willing to compromise and work for our collective security (Nordstrom, 
2007). 
 
And I call upon governments, who really believe that, who have a bit of 
humanity, who wouldn’t want to be sitting under a nuclear threat themselves, to 
get real and give them up (Williams, 2010).  
 
 As this last fragment shows, Williams’ speech uses an informal vocabulary to 
send the same message the other speakers are trying to convey. Again, it is possible to 
see the exceptionality of her discourse; since she effectively ignores the formalities of 
the setting and the conventions established by the NGOs throughout the years of 
participation in these meetings. Williams’ disregard for these might be interpreted as a 
statement against the routinisation of NGOs’ presentations, which follow predictable 
patterns year after year. Williams’ engagement with the nuclear abolition movement is 
quite recent and the 2010 NPT Review Conference was the first time she addressed the 
elite audience. It would be interesting to follow her future speeches and presentations 
and see whether or not she will succumb to the established practices and vocabulary.  
 
Referent objects 
The referent object of the securitisation of nuclear weapons promoted by these 
non-state actors is undoubtedly located at the global level. Using different words, all the 
speakers try to convey the idea that the existence of nuclear weapons threatens “all 
peoples and nations”, “all humanity”, “civilisation” and “all the creatures of this Earth” 
(See UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008; Hill 2007). In this case, the mentioned 
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expressions are all equivalent and denote an all-encompassing collectivity. Although 
less frequently, “the environment”, “life on Earth” and the “global climate” are also 
mentioned by the speakers as referent objects (See UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008; 
McCoy, 2007; Westberg 2008). 
Even though there are only few individuals who would argue that the humanity 
and the environment are referent objects that do not have the legitimate right to survive, 
mobilising security policies at the global level has proved to be extremely difficult. As 
Buzan, et al. (1998), observed: “somehow, the system level candidates are still too 
subtle and indirect to trigger the levels of mass identity necessary for securitization” (p. 
37). In the absence of the dynamic underpinning of rivalry, mobilising identity politics 
at the global level constitutes a real challenge. Nevertheless, features of the alleged 
threat as well as the type of universalism the securitisers try to construct can make the 
universal scale possible. It is reasonable to assume that securitisations stemming from 
existing order and/or physical threat universalisms can achieve global scale.
39
 In this 
case, the securitisers must construct the existence of nuclear weapons as a physical 
threat to all nations and peoples in the world. As a strategy to mobilise social identities 
at the global level, the securitisers try to promote a sense of unity and commonality in 
the world. The speakers present the referent object in the first person plural; affirming 
that nuclear weapons threaten “our survival”, “our very existence”, “our collective fate”, 
“our world” and “our common future” (See UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008; Hill, 
2007; Mitchell, 2009). 
 
Other relevant actors 
Other relevant actors in this securitisation process are the national governments 
and their respective policy-making institutions, such as congresses and parliaments. At 
the national level, politicians can debate their position on nuclear proliferation and 
disarmament and even decide to adopt national legislations that outlaw nuclear weapons 
and strengthen the call for a NWC. States that are not party to the NPT are also 
                                                 
39
 In addition to nuclear weapons, environmental issues (global warming, global cooling, planetary impact 
of asteroids or comets) can, in principle, be securitised at the global level. Regarding existing order 
macrosecuritisations, Buzan and Wæver (2009) listed the following as issues that are likely to get 
securitised: sovereignty-denying transnational actors (whether corporate or criminal or terrorist), 
migration or cosmopolitanism and a general re-mobilisation of religion (p. 264).  
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mentioned by the securitisers as important actors who should also take part in the 
process leading to a NWC.  
Even though the average citizen does not take part in international negotiations, 
there are ways in which the general public, as well as the public opinion and the media, 
can play a relevant part. In the elite setting, the securitisers mention opinion polls results 
that demonstrate that the public is in favour of the total elimination of nuclear weapons 
(Hall, 2005). Policy-making takes into account different factors and, at least in 
democratic societies, it is plausible to assume that the public’s attitude towards a given 
issue can influence governmental choices. Popular initiatives, such as demonstrations, 
petitions and campaigns have had impact in nuclear related issues before. As it was 
showed in Chapter Three, pressures coming from a transnational movement against 
nuclear tests was a major factor in the Soviet decision to close the nuclear test site in 
Kazakhstan, in 1991. More recently, large-scale demonstrations against the British 
proposal to replace the Trident missile system in 2007 were followed by extensive 
media coverage and the release of opinion polls contrary to the governmental bid. When 
the issue was debated and voted in the British Parliament, the Labour government 
suffered its largest backbench rebellion on a defence policy since 1924 (Hudson, 2007) 
and was only able to approve the motion with the support of the opposition 
Conservative Party.  
Finally, terrorists are also important actors in this securitisation. The securitisers 
know that terrorist plans and/or attacks involving the use nuclear weapons could trigger 
major changes in the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. Therefore, they mention 
reported attempts to acquire nuclear material made by terrorist organisations and draw 
attention to the alleged availability of fissile material in the black market. According to 
them, an abolition regime would place further obstacles to terrorist attacks involving 
nuclear or radiological devices (See Hall, 2005; Reichl, 2007; Fowler, 2009). 
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4.2.2 Acts 
This level addresses the discursive and non-discursive practices that underwrite 
the securitisation, including: the use of the specific grammar of security (existential 
threat/ urgency/possible way out); the meaning of security according to the securitisers; 
the use of associative arguments; intertextual references; the use of heuristic artefacts 
and possible links with other securitisations.  
 
Existential threat 
Bearing in mind that “securitizers are in the business of insinuating their 
understandings and agendas” (Vaughn, 2009, p.279), the alarmist tone of their discourse 
should not come as a surprise. In this setting, the securitisers behave as “prophets of 
doom” (Krepon, 2011),40 always bringing bad news and making apocalyptical 
predictions for the future. In their discourse, the impending possibility of nuclear 
weapons being used is always present. In all texts analysed, there is one clear message: 
the existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity. 
Even though the preamble of the draft NWC constitutes only a small section of 
the Convention, it contains numerous references to the dangers represented by nuclear 
weapons. The way the nuclear threat is articulated in this document follows the general 
pattern of how the threat is construed in this setting by the nuclear abolition 
organisations. There are three main sources of arguments used in the making of the 
threat: (1) particular features of nuclear weapons, (2) potential incidents involving 
nuclear weapons and (3) foreseeable consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. 
Among the particular features of nuclear weapons listed by the securitisers in the 
construction of the threat image are the following: its radioactive nature; its 
“unprecedented and unequalled” destructive potential; the uncontrollability of its 
destructive effects; its indiscriminate nature (See UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008; 
Hall, 2005; Johnson, 2010; Williams, 2010). The fact that modernisation of nuclear 
weaponry has only enhanced all these characteristics is also part of the securitising 
discourse. 
                                                 
40
 Krepon uses this expression to refer to the recent behaviour of arms controllers since Obama came to 
power. He makes this observation, but does not explore the deep implications of such behaviour; nor does 
he refer to the securitisation theory.  
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The situations in which the NWS might use these weapons, as stated in their 
respective national security doctrines, figure prominently in the NGOs’ statements. In 
the nuclear abolitionist discourse, the use of nuclear weapons is constructed as an 
imminent reality; be it intentional or accidental. The securitisers frequently refer to the 
large amount of weapons that remain on hair-trigger alert in Russia and in the US and, 
thus, could be launched almost immediately. The speakers affirm that this could happen 
not only in a war-like scenario; but also by means of sabotage, unauthorised use, human 
or mechanical error (See Hall, 2005; Hill, 2007; Johnson, 2010). The possibility that 
terrorists might get hold of fissile material or even gain access to the nuclear command 
systems and carry out a nuclear attack are also considered in their securitising claims 
(Hallam, 2008).  
Based on studies conducted after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 
on expert calculations of hypothetical scenarios, the securitisers make predictions about 
the consequences of an eventual use of nuclear weapons. One speaker, for example, 
attempted to describe what would follow a nuclear attack, stating that:   
 
Once the worst has happened – whether an all-out nuclear war caused by 
accident or a "limited" nuclear war – health services will break down. The 
number of burns alone would overwhelm the most well-equipped burns unit. 
Assuming there are any burns units. Or people to staff them. Radiation sickness 
will follow. Many people will die a terrible death without any medical relief at 
all (Hall, 2005). 
 
In addition to these vivid descriptions of the immediate impacts of a nuclear 
attack, the securitisers address the long-term consequences of a nuclear war; such as the 
cooling effect it would have on global climate, known as “nuclear winter”. They draw 
attention to the high number of deployed nuclear weapons in the world - more than 
22,000 in 2010 -,
41
 and affirm that these weapons are capable of precipitating nuclear 
winter several times over (Westberg, 2008). According to these prophets of doom, 
global cooling would result in the collapse of the Earth’s life supporting ecosystems 
(Westberg, 2008).  
 
 
                                                 
41
 Estimate number calculated by SIPRI researchers, as January 2010 (Kile, et al., 2010). 
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Sense of urgency 
Year after year, the members of the NGOs remind the audience of the failures of 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime and reaffirm the urgency of strengthening the 
regime and its foundation, the NPT. Exemplary of this behaviour is the opening line 
with which a speaker chose to start his presentation: “Mr. Chairman, distinguished 
delegates, ladies and gentlemen, more bad news” (Cipolat, 2007). The “bad news” 
exposed by the securitisers primarily refer to the NWS’ lack of commitment to 
disarmament measures. Their failure to disarm is usually presented in connection with 
the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries (See Burroughs 2005, 2009).  
According to the securitisers, putting an end to this proliferation cycle should be 
the top priority of all states. In their discourse, proliferation represents many perils; the 
most immediate one being the weakening of the NPT regime. In face of the proliferation 
that has taken place outside the regime, the speakers affirm that the NPT is in crisis and 
it must be strengthened. As one speaker said, 
 
Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea. That makes nine nuclear weapons states, 
despite the NPT. Who will be the next nuclear weapon state? If the NPT falls 
apart, we will be forced to live in a world with dozens of countries armed with 
nuclear weapons and no controls? Already nuclear technology is being sold on 
the black market (Hall, 2005).  
 
The other danger that comes along with proliferation is the availability of larger 
quantities of fissile material in the world. In the securitising discourse, this is always 
associated with the possibility of terrorists getting hold of nuclear-weapon material. As 
one speaker put it, “the dark cloud of nuclear terrorism continues to hang over all our 
heads” (Weiss, 2009). Mentioning the concerns regarding the existence of a nuclear 
black market, the securitisers enhance the sense of urgency inherent to the securitising 
claim.  
Additionally, proliferation represents an increased probability that nuclear 
weapons might be used. In fact, this is one of the basic arguments underpinning the 
securitising claims; that is, “if such weapons spread, the risk of their eventual use would 
increase exponentially” (Acheson, 2007). As it should be clear by now, security 
arguments always involve predictions about the future (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 32). 
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Therefore, the securitisers often mention what will happen if the security action they 
propose is not taken. For instance,  
 
If urgent action is not taken by the 2010 Review Conference to reverse this 
course, we may well wake up in 2011 to world with a larger number of virtual 
and actual nuclear weapon states, and the nuclear sword of Damocles poised 
over the heads of all peoples until at least mid-century (McCoy, 2007). 
 
The securitisers try to convey the idea that if the audience is unable to negotiate 
the abolition of nuclear weapons, another use of nuclear weapons will follow. Instead of 
waiting for the worse to happen, the diplomats must take action now, because “the 
world does not have the luxury of too much more time” (Williams, 2010). 
 
Way out 
 Following the particular grammar of security, the securitisers always assert that 
threat they describe is avoidable, what is “desperately needed” is the commitment to 
begin negotiations on a NWC (Ware, 2007). The elimination of nuclear weapons 
worldwide is the proposed solution to avert the nuclear threat. In fact, the securitisers 
argue that it is the only solution. They affirm that any use of nuclear weapons would 
bear catastrophic consequences, so “going down to three zeros, as in 1000, is not 
enough” (Weiss, 2009); “abolition is the only way” (Hall, 2005).  
Even though the most important action advocated by the securitisers refers to the 
commencement of good faith negotiations for the adoption of a NWC, there are other 
steps that can be taken to reduce the nuclear danger. The securitisers mention a myriad 
of them, such as: the halting of nuclear weapons research, testing, and component 
production; the establishment of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FCMT); the creation 
of new Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ); the withdrawal of American nuclear 
forces deployed in Europe; the de-alerting of nuclear weapons; the commitment to a no-
first-use policy and the completion of further reductions in the American and Russian 
tactical and strategic nuclear stockpiles.  
The securitisers assert that the establishment of a NWC, together with all these 
specific measures, will provide the definite solution to overcome the threat posed by the 
existence of nuclear weapons. This, however, should not be a process contained in 
itself. The securitisers defend that the abolition of nuclear weapons should lead to other 
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changes in international affairs, like total disarmament and the creation of a new 
concept of security, structured around the notion of human security (See Hall, 2005; 
Spies, 2007; Cabasso, 2009; Johnson, 2010).  
 
Meaning of security  
 The need to address the meaning the securitisers attribute to the concept of 
security has been pointed out by Ciută (2009). According to him, the securitisation 
framework as it was established by the Copenhagen School privileges an inflexible 
definition of security, structured by the logic of survival in the face of existential 
threats. In order to make the securitisation analysis complete, he argued that it was 
necessary to take into account the self-understanding of the actors with regards to the 
meaning of security. Then, the analyst would be able to grasp potential contextual 
variations in the meaning of security.  
Examining the definitions of security provided by the securitisers in the time 
span selected for this study (1997-2010), it is not possible to identify significant 
contextual changes. The securitisers have always emphasised the need to address 
security issues from the perspective of human security, “moving away from patterns of 
aggressive national security and reducing reliance on weapons” (Johnson, 2010). From 
this point of view, they have tried to break the link between nuclear deterrence and 
national security; while strengthening the connection between nuclear disarmament and 
security. Since the members of the nuclear abolition NGOs consider nuclear weapons to 
be a security threat, they assert that nuclear deterrence provides only an illusion of 
security (Snyder, 2008). Accordingly, they state that the possession of nuclear weapons 
do not make people and states safe. In reality, it is the other way around; the “nuclear 
balance of terror” fosters insecurity rather than security (Spies, 2005).  
Since it can put an end to the existential threat, nuclear disarmament is always 
depicted as essential to security. In this sense, the meaning securitisers attach to the 
concept of security follows the definition of security provided by the securitisation 
theory, as they identify security with the logic of survival.  
For a long time, the securitisers have argued that disarmament as a means to 
achieve security should be framed in terms of human security. In the late 1990s, the 
notion of human security gained visibility as the ICBL successfully structured the 
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political debate on landmines around the safety of peoples rather than the safety of 
states. However, policy-makers have expressed scepticism toward the very idea of 
human security, which is often considered an inconsistent and poorly defined term. In 
all its inclusiveness, human security has seemed too broad to be useful in security or 
foreign policy making (King and Murray, 2001/2002, p. 591) and discussions on 
nuclear disarmament have seldom been approached by states from that perspective. 
 
Associative arguments 
Vaughn (2009) has shed light on the important role associative arguments can 
play in the construction of security threats. Analysing humanitarian organisations acting 
as securitisers, she noted that their securitising discourse linked multiple referent objects 
in the construction of a threat image. Vaughn (2009) concluded that associating 
different referent objects could enhance the legitimacy of the humanitarian 
organisations’ claim to survival and also boost the sense of urgency of their claims (p. 
264). In the case of the securitisation of nuclear weapons, the securitisers promote 
associative arguments that support the need to eliminate these weapons. They are not 
strictly security arguments, since they do not refer to nuclear weapons as a security 
concern or an existential threat. They are mostly economic, legal and political 
arguments that support the establishment of the security measure, the NWC. As such, 
these arguments are expected to resonate well in this setting, as they encompass issues 
that are familiar to the diplomats attending the NPT Review Conferences or the UN 
General Assembly. Making use of these associative arguments, the securitisers attempt 
to strengthen their case against nuclear weapons, calling attention to additional 
problems caused by these weapons and other benefits that the establishment of a NWC 
would bring.  
In this setting, securitisers promote realist arguments that support their 
securitising claims. Focusing on the interests of the states, the speakers argue that the 
end of the Cold War and the geopolitical changes that followed it have made nuclear 
weapons unnecessary. According to them, in today’s world, nuclear weapons are of “no 
use at all, to any one, for any reason” (Hall, 2005). They argue that the new security 
threats that the world is facing today, such as terrorism and climate change, cannot be 
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averted through possession of nuclear weapons. Thus, if nuclear weapons are not useful, 
their prohibition should not affect the interests of states.  
There are also economic arguments that could appeal to national governments, 
since the maintenance and development of nuclear weapons requires large sums of 
money. The securitisers usually quote the estimated costs of producing, replacing, 
maintaining and operating nuclear warheads in each of the NWS (See Cabasso, 2007; 
Loretz, 2007). The speakers state that there are better ways of spending this money, like 
“investing in technology to promote human security” (Hall, 2005).  
 Widely used in this setting, legal arguments assert the legal obligation to disarm, 
as stated in Article VI of the NPT. As supporting evidence, the members of the NGOs 
frequently recall the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons, which asserted that such legal obligation must be fulfilled (See UN 
General Assembly 1997, 2008; Weiss, 2000; Mitchell, 2009). The securitisers also 
argue that the use of nuclear weapon should be considered as a war crime, as well as a 
crime against humanity (Johnson, 2010). 
 As part of their political arguments, the securitisers often recall previous UNGA 
resolutions and declarations made by the UN Secretary General in favour of nuclear 
disarmament. Statements in support of a nuclear-weapon-free world made by major 
political figures are also quoted in this setting. In this regard, Obama’s Prague speech 
has been exhaustively repeated (See Cabasso, 2009; Weiss, 2009; Johnson, 2010; 
Williams, 2010). Additionally, the support of the general public, as stated in different 
opinion polls, is also a political argument employed in this setting (Hall, 2005). 
Even though the speakers refer to nuclear weapons as immoral, they do not 
elaborate on this argument. One reason for that might be that the securitisers are trying 
distance themselves from the utopianism that has been commonly associated with the 
anti-nuclear movement. Furthermore, the securitisers may have chosen to emphasise 
legal, political and economic factors assuming that these would resonate better with this 
particular audience than moral arguments. As the anti-landmine campaign has 
demonstrated, moral arguments can have a significant impact on the general public, but 
they can influence the elite audience too. Featuring landmine victims proved to be an 
effective strategy aimed at changing the way these weapons were perceived by the 
ordinary citizens and state officials (Rutherford, 2000). If Hibakusha, the survivors of 
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the atomic bombings, featured more prominently in the securitising moves carried out in 
this setting, there is a chance that their testimony could serve as a moral argument to 
stigmatize nuclear weapons. Even though there is usually one Hibakusha who speaks to 
the national delegates during the NPT meetings, they always end up as isolated voices, 
since the other speakers seldom evoke their touching stories.  
 
Intertextuality  
In various ways, discourses are always connected to other discourses. The most 
obvious links between them appear in the form of quotations and reported speeches. In 
this setting, the securitisers make reference to numerous UN documents and working 
papers; as well as texts of international treaties and expert reports regarding non-
proliferation and disarmament. These are different kinds of texts supporting the need to 
move toward a nuclear-weapon-free world and, thus, serve to strengthen the securitising 
claim. It is important to note that the nuclear abolition activists choose to make 
reference to texts which are familiar to the elite audience. As Balzacq (2011a) has 
observed, “to persuade the audience […] the speaker has to tune his/her language to the 
audience’s experience” (p. 09). This seems to be part of the strategy of the securitisers, 
whose discourse in this setting includes political and diplomatic jargon and references 
to issues of relevance to the audience.  
In the pursuit of supporting evidence to make their case stronger, the securitisers 
mention academic and expert studies, as well as NGO publications and campaigns. As it 
could be expected, the text of the NWC and the books that contain it – Security and 
survival and Securing our Survival (SOS) – are referred to frequently. The Doomsday 
Clock and the minutes left until midnight are constantly evoked by the securitisers. As 
Vuori (2010) has observed, by mentioning the Clock, the securitisers try to convey a 
sense of imminent doom (p. 259). 
Veiled references are less widespread. Recently, most of these have referred to 
Obama’s Prague speech. In his original speech, President Obama said:  
 
So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the 
peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I'm not naive. This goal 
will not be reached quickly –- perhaps not in my lifetime (The White House, 
2009). 
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This has led securitisers to reinstate their belief in the possibility of eliminating 
nuclear weapons that “in our lifetimes” (Johnson, 2010). Making this sort of reference is 
intended to urge the audience to tackle the threat more vigorously. In this respect, Jody 
Williams’ presentation stands out for its clear message and its sometimes aggressive 
tone. In the 2010 NPT Review Conference, she concluded her speech urging the 
audience: “get rid of them [nuclear weapons] now, not when Mr. Obama is dead” 
(Williams, 2010).  
 
Heuristic artefacts  
 As Balzacq (2005, 2011a) has repeatedly affirmed, metaphors, images, 
analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc. employed by the securitisers can effectively 
contribute to the construction of an intersubjective threat perception. In the anti-nuclear 
securitising discourse, the securitisers make use of many heuristic artefacts. For 
instance, in the elite setting, the nuclear abolition movement presents its cause in 
analogy with the movement against slavery. Accordingly, NWS and their refusal to 
honour disarmament commitments are represented like slave owners who refused to 
accept the abolition of slavery. On one occasion, the securitisers reminded the audience 
that the movement fighting against slavery used the word abolition deliberately, so as to 
make clear that “no slavery whatsoever would be tolerated, because slavery itself is 
entirely unacceptable” (Hill, 2007). The speakers, themselves nuclear abolitionists, 
intend to act the same way, “keeping their eyes in the prize”, the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons under a NWC (Ibid.).  
Another analogy employed by the securitisers depicts countries that possess 
nuclear weapons as “nuclear addicts” who keep telling the others to quit their addiction. 
Trying to expose the contradictory behaviour of states that support non-proliferation but 
continue to upgrade their own nuclear arsenal, a speaker stated that “a smoker cannot 
forbid other smokers” (Hall, 2005). This analogy has also been used by other people, on 
different occasions. Former Director-General of the IAEA, Mohammad ElBaradei, 
made a similar statement, saying that: “as long as you continue to have countries 
dangling a cigarette from their mouth, you cannot tell everybody not to smoke with a 
high degree of credibility” (Reuters, 2004). 
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Another heuristic artefact that has been used by political figures and then 
repeated by the nuclear abolition activists is the genie metaphor, which refers to the 
unfeasibility of abolishing nuclear weapons as the impossibility of putting the genie 
back in the bottle. As the securitisers repeat this analogy, they argue the opposite; 
affirming that it is possible to put the genie back inside the bottle (Cabasso, 2009).  
Using a metaphor provided by Schultz, et al., the securitisers have referred to the 
goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world as the top of a mountain which must be reached, as 
“there are too many dangers inherent in either staying where we are or, worse still, 
sliding back down into proliferation chaos” (Johnson, 2010). The members of the 
NGOs, however, emphasise that they see this mountain from a different position than 
the former Cold War leaders. For the “Cold Warriors”, the “goal and the route to get 
there are both out of sight”; since there is layer of cold war fog obstructing their 
visibility (Ibid.). The securitisers affirm that they - the NGOs - can show the way to the 
top of the mountain. They acknowledge the existence of obstacles and perils along the 
way, but affirm that they are prepared to overcome those problems (Ibid.).  
One common metaphor in the anti-nuclear discourse is the “sword of 
Damocles”. Since the American president John F. Kennedy compared the omnipresent 
threat of nuclear annihilation to a sword of Damocles hanging over the people of the 
world, in 1961, this expression has been widely employed. In this setting, the 
securitisers make use of this powerful metaphor to enhance the sense of danger and the 
urgency of the issue.  
In the construction of intersubjective threat perceptions, the establishment of 
watchwords that evoke the logic of danger, vulnerability and fear can be quite valuable 
Different scholars have showed that the use of watchwords decrease the need for 
elaborate arguments about the “securityness” of specific cases (Buzan and Wæver, 
2009; Vuori, 2010). The anti-nuclear movement, however, has failed to establish a 
strong watchword supporting their securitising moves in the post-Cold War period. 
Although “Hiroshima” and “Nagasaki” can be considered as watchwords, since they 
work “as symbolic short hands that trigger vivid imagery and built-in narratives that do 
not have to be unfolded” (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 267), the strength and 
effectiveness of these words has decreased throughout the years. Another term used by 
the securitisers that conveys a similar message is “Hibakusha”. Nevertheless, many 
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people are unfamiliar with the concept of Hibakusha; which certainly reduces the 
impact of its use. 
Emotions are another sort of heuristic artefacts that can configure a valuable 
resource in the construction of a threat. As Crawford (2002) has noted, persuasive 
arguments frequently use emotional appeals and draw on feelings (p. 78). However, in 
the elite setting, the nuclear abolitionists have refrained from making the emotional case 
against nuclear weapons. Even images, which are a common vehicle to express 
emotions (Vuori, 2010, p. 260), have rarely been employed by the securitisers in this 
setting. While there are probably some practical obstacles to bringing images and videos 
to the elite conferences, the Hibakusha sometimes show pictures during their 
presentations in the NGO sessions of the NPT meetings. These are usually strong 
images, depicting themselves and other people in the aftermath of the bombings. As 
such, these images can have a significant emotional impact on the audience. In this 
setting, it is evident that the Hibakusha are in charge of the emotional appeal to the 
audience, while the nuclear abolition NGOs focus on technical and political questions.  
Most of the time, the securitisers follow this division and the members of the 
anti-nuclear NGOs avoid making emotionally charged presentations. The one exception 
to the rule is Jody Williams, whose statement before the 2010 NPT Review Conference 
was very emotional. Making use of an informal tone, she talked about her first trip to 
Hiroshima, which took place a couple of years ago. She told the audience that, in 
Hiroshima, “you can feel the spirit of the tens of thousands of people that were 
vaporised in an instant by the use of that indiscriminate weapon” (Williams, 2010). 
Williams then recounted walking inside a shop in Hiroshima and communicating 
through hand signals with an old Japanese woman who, she said, “might even 
remember the bomb of Hiroshima” (Ibid.). The Japanese lady enveloped Williams in a 
silk kimono, the sleeves of which went all the way to the floor. Williams said that the 
image of herself wearing that kimono was similar to an image she had seen in 
Hiroshima’s Peace Museum; which depicted 
 
A woman, with her arms outstretch, running away from the flames of the 
nuclear bomb. And her skin fell, like great loops that I had seen in wearing the 
kimono. It was human skin, like a human kimono, running away from the 
epicenter, where that bomb was dropped (Ibid.).  
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As it has been mentioned before, Williams was the coordinator of the ICBL – a 
network of organisations advocating for a landmine ban, which draw extensively on the 
participation of landmine victims and emphasised the humanitarian aspect of banning 
such weapons. Taking part in these securitising moves, she maintains a similar approach 
to the abolition of nuclear weapons, focusing on the human suffering caused by these 
weapons.  
 
Links with other securitisations 
 In order to be successful, it is expected that the anti-nuclear macrosecuritising 
discourse will attempt to create links between this particular security concern and other 
issues that are currently being framed in terms of security. As Buzan and Wæver (2009) 
have already observed, “it is almost impossible for any securitisation to stand by itself” 
(p. 268). Thus, a macrosecuritisation should be comprehensive and provide a frame of 
reference that is applicable to different security issues. In this sense, it would be 
reasonable to assume that the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation would be constructed in 
association with other securitisations – most likely, the threats of terrorism, proliferation 
of WMD, rogue/irrational states, climate change and nuclear energy.  
Even though it was possible to spot such linkages, they were less frequent and 
also weaker than one could expect. This might be because of the compartmentalisation 
which is characteristic of elite setting, where different institutions and UN bodies have 
been created to deal with relevant issues separately. Nonetheless, the inability to put 
together different concerns can be a weakness of this potential macrosecuritisation.  
In the current context, bringing together the threats of climate change and 
nuclear weapons would presumably enhance the securitisation of nuclear weapons. 
Environmental issues have been associated with nuclear weapons before, for instance in 
the struggle to outlaw nuclear tests. Moreover, both climate change and nuclear 
weapons represent the possibility of self-destruction of the humankind. The securitisers 
are aware of this, so they mention different environmental problems that are connected 
to the production of nuclear weapons; like the negative impact of uranium mining and 
the radioactive mine wastes, the possibility of water contamination and the threat of a 
“nuclear winter” (See Ramdas, 2000; McCoy, 2007; Slater, 2007; Westberg, 2008). As 
one speaker has stated, 
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The destruction caused by nuclear weapons occurs along a continuum, 
beginning with the cancers and reproductive health problems inflicted on 
miners, downwinder communities, and other nuclear workers, and ending with 
the potential deaths of hundreds of millions of people and the permanent 
poisoning of their habitats in a nuclear war (McCoy, 2007). 
 
Nuclear energy as a security threat has played only a marginal part in the 
securitising discourse.
42
 Nonetheless, there are speakers who directly or indirectly 
criticise the use of nuclear power, mentioning the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe and 
advocating for the development of “clean, safe, climate-friendly energy production” 
(Reichl, 2007). The nuclear abolition NGOs have campaigned for the establishment of 
an “International Sustainable Energy Agency” (Slater, 2007) – a project that came to 
life in 2009, when 75 countries came together and signed the statute of the International 
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).
43
  
Not only does nuclear power represent the danger of an environmental disaster, 
it also signifies the possibility of nuclear material being diverted to use in weapons or 
falling into the hands of terrorists. As one speaker has put it, “the pursuit of nuclear 
energy has become a leading cause of conflict around the world due to the inherently 
dual use nature of the nuclear fuel cycle” (Cabasso, 2009).  
The securitisers mention “the dangers of a post-9/11 world” (Loretz, 2007) and 
restate that horizontal proliferation and terrorism pose security threats at the global 
level. However, they argue that clinging to nuclear weapons will not lead to solution of 
these problems; nor will singling out “rogue states” (Burroughs, 2007). According to 
the speakers, the lack of disarmament inside the NWS feeds horizontal proliferation. 
Moreover, the securitisers affirm that “the very existence of nuclear weapons and fissile 
materials from which to make them leaves the world more vulnerable to attack from 
non-state actors” (Hall, 2005). The way out advocated by them is stronger control over 
fissile material, as part of the process leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons.  
The securitisers also argue that the solution they are proposing – nuclear 
disarmament – should be considered in the larger frame of human security (See Hall, 
                                                 
42
 After the incidents at Fukushima nuclear power plant, in 2011, it is reasonable to expect that this will 
change and nuclear energy as a security threat will figure more prominently in the nuclear abolition 
discourse.  
43
 For more information on the IRENA, see the website: www.irena.org [Accessed on 21 July 2011].  
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2005; Spies, 2007; Cabasso, 2009; Johnson, 2010). People-centred, the idea of human 
security enables the securitiser to associate all different issues that might threaten the 
safety of the people. Presumably, a broad, human security agenda would address the 
threat posed by nuclear weapons in connection with environmental concerns and the 
threats of nuclear energy, proliferation and terrorism.  
 
4.2.3 Contexts 
This level of analysis provides for the way contextual factors can empower or 
disempower the securitising actors. It is comprised by two subunits. The first one 
addresses the impact of the immediate setting on this securitisation process; including 
the particular political practices, the genre of interaction and the use of specialised 
language and common conventions. The second subunit refers to the larger contextual 
situation, the distal context. 
 
Immediate setting  
In the UNGA, the accredited NGOs are usually not allowed to participate in the 
committee meetings. Nonetheless, some of these organisations may attend the open 
sessions as observers, depending on their status with the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC). In spite of the evident power asymmetry, nuclear abolition 
organisations have managed to interact with states and have their voice heard in the 
Assembly sessions. By strategising and aligning themselves with states sympathetic to 
their aims, like Costa Rica and Malaysia, the model NWC drafted by the nuclear 
abolition NGOs reached the national delegations to the UNGA.  
Inside the NPT Review Process, the draft has also circulated among the states 
parties, at the request of Costa Rica and Malaysia. Moreover, the NGOs have been able 
to gradually insert themselves in the NPT Preparatory Committees and Review 
Conferences. These civil society organisations are far from participating on an equal 
foot with the states parties, but significant progress has been achieved. Starting from the 
1994 Preparatory Committee, NGO representatives have been allowed to observe open 
meetings and, since the 2000 Review Conference, NGOs have been allocated one whole 
session to address the NPT delegates. Official documents related to the NPT meetings 
are provided to NGOs as available. Moreover, the organisations can distribute their own 
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written material to the delegations informally, outside the official meeting rooms 
(Regehr, 2003).  
These conditions, however, are still insufficient. Several speakers have 
expressed their frustrations related to the fact that the majority of the sessions of the 
NPT review process are in cluster working groups, closed to NGOs.
44
 Moreover, they 
have complained about the lack of proper seating arrangements in the open sessions. 
These two complaints are part of the NGOs’ discourse; in which they praise the 
conditions accomplished, but demand more. Common requests include that NGOs be 
allowed to participate in all NPT plenary and cluster sessions, be provided with 
appropriate seating within the conference hall (as opposed to the public gallery) and be 
guaranteed access to all documentation in a timely manner (See Burroughs, 2007; 
Slater, 2007).  
While the access to the NPT meetings is still limited and opportunities to 
intervene within the thematic discussions are scarce, the NGOs try to make the most of 
their resources and conditions. The restrictions of the setting have encouraged them to 
work together, so as to make their presentations more efficient. In the months preceding 
the NPT meetings, the organisations try to discuss contentious issues and negotiate 
compromises between differences that may exist among them. In the elite setting, the 
securitisers avoid making reference to any internal disagreements, so they structure their 
presentations around common positions. As one speaker has told the audience, “we 
enter this room with a clear sense of purpose and a unified voice” (Snyder, 2004). 
Analysing the presentations delivered by the nuclear abolition activists to the 
diplomatic audience, it is possible to see the professional tone of their advocacy work. 
The securitisers follow the formalities of this setting and avoid sounding too idealistic 
or emotional. As a rule, the speakers read the statements that have been previously 
agreed on by all NGOs. Whenever it was possible to compare the written statements to 
the oral presentations, only minor changes were observed. In the elite setting, 
spontaneity has no place in anti-nuclear securitising moves. Moreover, one could not 
                                                 
44
 In the 2004 NPT Preparatory Committee, the NGOs had access to cluster sessions. This took place after 
South Africa raised a point of order suggesting a different interpretation to Rule 44.4 of the rules of 
procedure. Supported by Mexico, Germany, Canada, and Chile, South Africa argued that the cluster 
debates at the Preparatory Committees fall under the Main Committees, which meant that NGOs should 
have access to them. As no one objected, NGOs were let in. This procedural progress, however, was not 
recorded in the 2004 final document, despite the efforts of some of the states parties. In the following 
year, states did not follow this precedent and NGOs were blocked from attending the cluster debates.  
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spot significant changes in the format or content of the securitising discourse in the 
thirteen years analysed in this chapter. As it became clear in this analysis, Jody 
Williams’ statement was the one exception to the rule. Adopting a rather informal 
attitude, she recounted personal reminiscences and shared emotions with the audience. 
This was only possible because Williams decided to break the normal procedures and 
ignore the statement she was supposed to read.  
At the end of the NGO presentations, the audience is expected to comment on 
the speeches and/or ask questions to the speakers. Most of the time, however, the room 
is quite empty by the end of the session. Moreover, there is usually not much time left 
for exchange of ideas and discussions, as the securitisers tend to use most of the three-
hour session for their own presentations. Trying to improve the weak interaction 
between the national delegates and the members of NGOs, states have put forward 
proposals to reform the rules governing the NPT meetings. So far, however, there have 
been no formal concessions that increase exchanges between the two groups.  
 
Distal context 
In the anti-nuclear macrosecuritising discourse it is possible to spot several 
references to the broad context of international politics. For instance, the speakers 
frequently mentioned the end of the Cold War and tried to draw some implications from 
it; stating that in today’s world, nuclear weapons do not provide security. Other positive 
developments in world affairs addressed by the securitisers included the indefinite 
extension of the NPT in 1995 and the advisory opinion on the legality of threat or use of 
nuclear weapons issued by the ICJ in 1996.  
As it could be expected, negative developments are much more abundant in the 
securitising discourse. The securitisers mentioned the difficulties encountered during 
the negotiations of bilateral agreements to reduce the number of deployed warheads in 
the US and Russia; like START II, START III and, more recently, the New START. 
The US Senate rejection of the CTBT in 1999, the American withdrawal from the ABM 
Treaty in 2001 and the failure of the CD to produce agreement on a FMCT are also 
present in their discourse. Even agreements that are signed and ratified may be met with 
criticisms by the securitisers; who often complain about the weak provisions of SORT, 
for instance.  
 82 
News about vertical proliferation are also mentioned by the securitisers, who 
denounce the modernisation of the NWS arsenal, arguing that the major powers have 
failed to put an end to the arms race. In view of the states which have developed nuclear 
weapons outside the regime, the securitisers argued that the NPT is in crisis and it must 
be strengthened. After the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the securitisers 
have raised the alarmist tone of their discourse. Since then, other contextual factors have 
also been used to boost the urgency of their claims; like: the nuclear tests conducted by 
the DPRK, the suspicious around the Iranian programme and reports of an emerging 
nuclear black market.  
Since 2007, however, the speakers have begun to mention a window of 
opportunity, affirming that “the security environment is changing, the cold war fogs are 
clearing” (Johnson, 2010). They continued to emphasise the bad news, but they also 
highlighted the growing political support for nuclear disarmament. They welcomed the 
new and influential voices calling for nuclear abolition; like Schultz, et al., and 
President Obama. The securitisers called on these political leaders to match words with 
deeds. As one speaker has said,  
 
Today, we see leaders of nuclear weapon states again promising to abolish 
nuclear weapons. It is a good sign. But we have been here before. This time the 
world needs more than promises (Mian, 2009). 
 
In the securitising discourse, not only does the world need to move towards 
nuclear abolition now but the current political configuration is also favourable to it. This 
fortunate temporal coincidence has served to enhance even more the urgency of 
adopting the security measure. The securitisers entail the possibility of this momentum 
being over soon and defend that action be taken now, before “night falls again” 
(Johnson, 2010).  
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5. Conclusion 
The new nuclear disarmament momentum and the developments regarding the 
concept of macrosecuritisation demonstrated the relevance and the viability of 
examining the nuclear abolition movement from an original perspective. Although the 
causal influence of the nuclear abolition movement on the political decisions regarding 
acquisition, use or dismantlement of nuclear weapons is beyond the reach of the theory 
of securitisation, and perhaps beyond the reach of any theory (Vuori, 2010, p. 275), the 
securitisation framework provided the lens through which to examine the anti-nuclear 
macrosecuritising discourse. Combining this theory with discourse analysis, it was 
possible to see that, in the campaign for a NWC, the anti-nuclear organisations present 
the logic of zero as driven by a threat. As Buzan, et al. (1998), have observed, to phrase 
things in security terms is always a choice, “not an objective feature of the issue or the 
relationship itself” (p. 211).  In principle, the logic of disarmament could be driven by 
other factors; such as legal, political, economic or moral arguments. However, states 
have usually framed nuclear weapons in terms of threat/defence and, while addressing 
this audience, the securitisers tread a similar path.  
Certainly, genuine fear that these weapons may be used again exists, but this 
does not fully explain the decision to promote a securitising discourse. In the military 
sector, the logic of threat has usually provided the optimal base for a successful 
argument. The instrumentality of the securitising discourse becomes apparent; in this 
case, the alarmist tone of the discourse provides these non-state actors with a loud voice 
in international military affairs. As Vuori (2008) has noted, “security can be utilized for 
achieving several political aims” (p. 76). This particular securitisation process is aimed 
at raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action. 
The securitisers try to construct the use of nuclear weapons as an impeding 
reality, but the fact that these weapons have not been used since 1945 certainly weakens 
their claims. As one speaker has said, “undoubtedly, the use of a nuclear weapon 
somewhere in the world would provide a terrible shock and, if it did not escalate into 
nuclear war, could lead swiftly to global disarmament (Johnson, 2010)”. At an appalling 
cost for the victims and for the world, the use of nuclear weapons would probably cause 
worldwide commotion and provide the abolitionist cause with the emotional appeal it 
has been lacking. While these securitisers have legal, political, economic and security 
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arguments covered, they have not been able to make the emotional case against nuclear 
weapons. As different scholars have shown, emotions are an active component of 
identity and community; “they frame forms of personal and social understanding, and 
are thus inclinations that lead individuals to locate their identity within a wider 
collective” (Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008, p. 123). As so, they could be of great value to 
this attempt at macrosecuritisation.  
Another weakness of this securitisation process refers to the underuse of 
powerful images. Given the important role visual representations can play in the 
construction of a security issue, images could contribute greatly to the success of this 
securitisation. Particularly, the “desire to avoid images of mass destruction and civilian 
casualties” (Williams, 2003, p. 526) could be a powerful factor in support of the 
securitisation of nuclear weapons. As it has been noted in Chapter Four, the securitisers 
rarely employ visual devices in the elite setting. While there are probably practical 
obstacles to bringing images and videos to the elite conferences, the shortage of 
powerful images is also notable in the popular setting. For instance, the documentary 
Countdown to Zero approached the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack while 
showing images of the non-nuclear terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (NY), 
the Madrid rail, the London bus and subway. Only on few occasions the documentary 
featured images of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While it is difficult to 
state precisely the reasons underlying the producers’ choice, it is true that the anti-
nuclear movement has failed to keep the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki alive. 
Another indication of that is the lack of public awareness regarding the Hibakusha and 
their touching stories.  
 As it was demonstrated in Chapter Four, the securitisers try to enhance their 
claims through the construction of discursive linkages between the securitisation of 
nuclear weapons and other current security concerns. From the perspective of human 
security, the securitisers have tried to articulate the alleged threat of nuclear weapons 
with the fight against terrorism and nuclear proliferation, as well as environmental 
issues. According to them, the notion of human security provides a relevant frame to 
address the interconnected problems the world is currently facing. So far, however, the 
links between the securitisations are still weak and the frame of human security has not 
been accepted by the elite audience. Even though the point of view of human security 
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has been debated and even adopted in some particular discussions regarding military 
and environmental issues, there has been no indication that discussions pertaining 
nuclear weapons are going in this direction.  
The restrictions imposed by the power asymmetry between state and non-state 
actors in the elite setting, along with procedural limitations to the participation of civil 
society organisations, have served as a motivation to bring different nuclear abolition 
groups to work together. This can be considered a positive development, as it has 
encouraged the activists to develop common goals and strengthen shared positions. 
However, these constraints have also placed obstacles to the establishment of a dynamic 
interaction between the members of NGOs and the national delegates. Even though the 
audience has agreed to listen to the securitisers, it has not really engaged in a serious 
dialogue with them. As a consequence, the security practices involved in this 
securitisation have seemed rather static and, sometimes, resembled a monologue.  
The distal context was another important variable considered in this 
securitisation study. The failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference did indeed 
strengthen the perception that the NPT was in crisis. Accordingly, a discourse asserting 
the inability of the states parties to deal with the North Korean and Iranian nuclear 
programmes, as well as the emergence of a nuclear black market, gained force. In the 
face of the perceived urgency of the nuclear question, the securitisers raised the alarmist 
tone of their discourse and more people joined these prophets of nuclear doom in their 
efforts to turn abolition into reality or, at least, bring this option back to the negotiation 
table.  
Admittedly, the continued existence of (thousands of) nuclear weapons 
demonstrates that the anti-nuclear discourse has failed to reach its final objective. 
However, as the issue is again being discussed as part of a wider political debate 
reassessing the costs and benefits of nuclear deterrence, the endorsement of the 
description of the threat as existential might become stronger and more widespread. 
Even though the solution proposed by the securitisers has so far been rejected and there 
are no indications that serious negotiations on a NWC will happen any time soon, there 
is no reason to rule out this possibility. As Krepon (2007) has noted, “nuclear 
disarmament is a process, not an on-or-off switch”. Similarly, every securitisation is a 
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historical process (Balzacq, 2005, p. 193) and this one has been going on for more than 
half a century and it might continue for as long as it takes.  
Many are sceptical of the feasibility of nuclear abolition. It is true that nuclear 
weapons, like any other human creation, cannot be “disinvented”. They can, however, 
be prohibited and dismantled. As Acton and Perkovich (2009) have observed, 
civilisation has been capable of doing so in cases where the artefacts in question were 
considered too dangerous, damaging or morally objectionable to continue living with (p. 
17). For instance, the mass-scale gas chambers used by Nazi Germany have not been 
disinvented, but they are nevertheless not tolerated (Ibid.). Similarly, there is nothing 
intrinsic to nuclear weapons that makes their elimination impossible. It is up to us – 
academics, scientists, activists, political leaders, NGOs – to work on the conditions that 
will lead to the establishment of an international regime capable of verifying the 
dismantlement of nuclear weapons and minimising the risk of cheating. It is by no 
means an easy task, but political will and leadership coupled with monitoring 
technologies can overcome the large majority of the possible obstacles on the way to 
zero.  
 
5.1 Further Research 
One way to give continuity to this research would be to keep investigating the 
securitising moves in the elite setting and conduct participant observation in the future 
meetings of the NPT Preparatory Committees and the 2015 NPT Review Conference. It 
would require a long-term commitment, but the analysis would certainly be more 
complete. Additionally, one could conduct interviews with the members of the abolition 
organisations and carry out a deeper investigation on their views of security and 
disarmament.  
It would also be interesting to analyse the securitising moves conducted by the 
anti-nuclear movement in the popular, scientific and technocratic settings. A 
comparison between the securitising discourse in these different arenas would enable 
the analyst to study eventual variances in content and format.  
One last avenue for future research would be to pay attention to the links 
between the securitisation of nuclear weapons and other security concerns; chiefly, 
climate change and nuclear energy. As opposition to nuclear energy appears to be 
 87 
increasing since the disaster at Fukushima nuclear power plant, there is a chance that the 
anti-nuclear and environmental movements will join forces again to advocated 
decreased reliance in nuclear energy as well as in nuclear weapons.  
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